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The astonishing brutality of Beijing's clampdown on pro-democracy
advocates near Tiananmen Square four years ago placed human rights in
the forefront of U.S. policy concerns in the People's Republic of China
(PRC). Perhaps inevitably, the debate over U.S. human rights policy
toward Beijing has had a profound impact on the expanding web of trade
and investment between the United States and China-itself a central
concern of U.S. policy. The Tiananmen incident thus wove together two
strands of U.S. policy toward the PRC that had previously been thought
to be unrelated, raising a raft of complex policy dilemmas to which satis-
factory solutions still remain to be fashioned.
The focus of debate has been the annual renewal of China's most-
favored-nation (MFN) trade status, but concerns about China's enduring
human rights problems have pervaded virtually every aspect of U.S.-
China trade and investment relations. However inconsistently enforced,
sanctions ranging from a ban on military and high-technology sales to
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China2 to a prohibition on involvement by the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation in Chinese projects3 have been used to promote human
rights improvements.
But if the most visible debates have centered on U.S. trade and aid
policies, a potentially more far-reaching debate is taking place in the
boardrooms of corporate America. From Levi Strauss & Co. to Phillips-
Van Heusen, from Sears, Roebuck and Co. to Reebok International Ltd.,
companies are asking how their role as investors can and should be
shaped by human rights concerns in the PRC and other countries.
The answers that have emerged from these companies' deliberations
reflect a pathbreaking reconception of corporate responsibility-one in
which human rights occupy a central place. In March 1992, Sears, Roe-
buck and Co. announced that it would not import products produced by
prison or other involuntary labor in China, and established a monitoring
procedure to ensure compliance with its policy. In November 1990,
Reebok International Ltd. condemned military repression in China and
vowed that it "will not operate under martial law conditions" or "allow
any military presence on its premises." Two years later, Reebok adopted
a human rights code of conduct governing workplace conditions in all of
its overseas operations, including those in China. Phillips-Van Heusen
currently threatens to terminate orders from suppliers that violate
human rights principles enshrined in its ethical code.4 Adopting the
most far-reaching policies, Levi Strauss & Co. and the Timberland Com-
pany apply human rights criteria in their selection of business partners,
and avoid investing at all in countries where there are pervasive viola-
tions of basic human rights. In February 1993, the Timberland Com-
pany decided to end its sourcing from China. Two months later, Levi
Strauss & Co. announced that it would end its relations with business
partners in China, and would not initiate any direct investment there.
While these companies are in the vanguard of an emerging trend,
their approach to human rights remains exceptional within the business
community. Still, their initiatives have presented a bold challenge to the
conventional view that business practice and human rights policy should
remain largely separate, and have spurred a broader debate about the
role of human rights in corporations' overseas investment decisions.
Should companies invest at all in countries, like China, where severe
2 Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 610, 103 Stat. 988, 1038 (1989).
3 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 1-1-246, § 902(a)(1)-(2), 104 Stat. 15, 83
(1990).
4 John McCormick & Mark Levinson, The Supply Police: The Demand for Social Responsibility
Forces Business to Look Far Beyond its own Front Door, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15, 1993, at 48.
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human rights abuses are pervasive? If they do invest, should they restrict
their operations to areas of the country that have a comparatively good
human rights record? Are there basic principles that transnational com-
panies should observe to ensure, at a minimum, that they do not become
complicit in a host government's abrogation of universally-recognized
human rights? Should such principles be enforced by Executive or con-
gressional fiat, or should companies take primary responsibility for polic-
ing themselves? How can companies that wish to factor human rights
considerations into their business decisions be assured that they will not
pay a price in lost investment opportunities or reduced market share?
This article addresses these questions in light of relevant principles
of international law and U.S. foreign policy. A central thesis of this arti-
cle is that businesses that may or do invest in China bear a responsibility
to ensure that their actions do not, however inadvertently, contribute to
the systematic denial of human rights in the PRC. We believe, moreover,
that international human rights law provides an objective basis for identi-
fying those responsibilities.
We also believe that, in some circumstances, companies that invest
in China can and should play a more proactive role in advancing respect
for human rights. This view is based, above all, on the unique influence
of major foreign investors in China. Today, after a temporary downturn
in business activity in the year following the Tiananmen incident, the
U.S. business presence in China is at an all-time high. With total com-
mitted investment close to six billion dollars, in 1993 the United States is
China's second largest foreign investor. In the 1980s, U.S. companies
became one of China's top providers of foreign investment, technology
and management expertise. Few sectors of U.S. industry are absent, with
substantial U.S. investment projects across the length and breadth of the
country. Major U.S. petroleum companies have been among the most
active in both offshore and onshore exploration, as have the service com-
panies that complement them. In locations from Beijing to Lhasa, from
Guangzhou to Xian, U.S. companies manufacture everything from air
conditioners to airplanes, from baby food to ball bearings, and from cars
to computers. Major U.S. hotel chains are in business as investors, man-
agers or both. U.S. companies involved in business projects in China
include numerous household names-Boeing, H.J. Heinz, Coca-Cola,
PepsiCo, 3M, Xerox, IBM and AT&T, to name just a few-as well as a
large number of smaller companies on and off the Fortune 500 list that
have made important commitments to China. Thousands of U.S. manag-
ers and company representatives live in China and interact with Chinese
business and legal officials on a daily basis.
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The importance of this large and growing U.S. presence to China's
drive for economic and technical modernization cannot be overesti-
mated. With the renewed ascendancy of the pragmatic, economic re-
form-oriented elements in the leadership, China is now pressing its
economic reform process full speed ahead. To advance that process, the
PRC has an overwhelming need for the investment, technology and man-
agerial skills that U.S. business has been providing. U.S. businesses are
thus in a unique position to capitalize on their importance to China by
upholding basic principles of respect for human rights in their daily busi-
ness activities in China.
Greater involvement by the U.S. business community in promoting
human rights in China is, to be sure, no substitute for the type of leverage
that can and should result from well planned and appropriately defined
governmental actions. We believe that more effective government poli-
cies are essential to an overall strategy for improving China's human
rights record. But increasingly, effective government action is likely to
include measures that directly affect transnational corporations.
Indeed, a key premise of our analysis is that questions relating to the
human rights responsibilities of transnational investors stand at the inter-
section of public and private spheres of law and policy. The powerful
influence of transnational corporations on human rights conditions in the
countries where they invest makes it both appropriate, and necessary, to
assure that the behavior of these private actors comports with the human
rights standards established by public international law and enforced by
national law.
While the role of regulatory regimes-national and international-is
an important part of any analysis of transnational corporations' human
rights responsibilities, effective leadership in defining those responsibili-
ties must come from the business community itself. In this, the chal-
lenges will be considerable. How to balance the imperatives of economic
growth in a highly competitive international market against the most
profound interests of human beings presents dilemmas to which no easy
solutions suggest themselves. In the final decade of the Twentieth Cen-
tury, the business community will be summoned to turn the same ingenu-
ity and commitment that rebuilt Japan and Germany in the postwar
years on the equally tortuous challenge presented by a country, like
China, that is marred by systematic violations of fundamental rights, and
at the same time is in massive need of support in reaching its develop-
ment and modernization goals. By forging a new cooperation between
business and the deepest interests of humanity, America's corporate lead-
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ership will continue in the future, as in the past, to promote basic stan-
dards of human decency across national borders.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN CHINA AND THE U.S. RESPONSE
The current debate over corporate responsibility vis-a-vis human
rights in China has been driven by three principal developments: 1) the
persistence of systematic violations of basic rights in the PRC since the
June 1989 crackdown near Tiananmen Square; 2) the inadequacy of U.S.,
as well as multilateral, sanctions in addressing those violations; and 3)
the surge in U.S. business investment in China in recent years, and the
correspondingly significant leverage that U.S. businesses have to promote
improvements in China's human rights record. With violations persist-
ing on a massive scale, U.S. companies that have substantial investments
in China are being pressed to account for the human rights consequences
of their China operations.
A. Human Rights Conditions in the PRC
Four years after the Tiananmen tragedy, the human rights situation
in the PRC remains critical. Despite repeated pronouncements by Chi-
nese officials that the cases of individuals involved in the Tiananmen af-
fair have "basically been resolved,"' political trials of dissident figures
involved in the 1989 events, Tibetan independence advocates, religious
figures and other political offenders apprehended for reasons unrelated to
Tiananmen have continued at a steady pace in the past year. Their trials
have been characterized by repeated violations of China's own legal pro-
cedures as well as international standards of due process and fair trial
procedures.6
Reports of maltreatment and torture of prisoners detained in China
are widely documented. Severe restrictions on freedoms of expression
5 Nicholas D. Kristof, China is Reported to Plan Release of Some Political Prisoners Soon, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 1992, at A12. On February 17, 1993, Tiananmen student leaders Wang Dan and
Guo Haifang were released from prison, both having served their full terms. The PRC government
claimed that these releases left no "students" in prison from the Tiananmen incident, a claim that
appeared to be patently untrue in light of information gathered by the human rights organization
Asia Watch, and in any event is misleading in view of the large number of prisoners of conscience
other than students-workers, intellectuals and others-who remain detained in the PRC for activi-
ties during and long after the 1989 events. See ASIA WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ECONOMIC
REFORM, POLITICAL REPRESSION: ARRESTS OF DISSIDENTS IN CHINA SINCE MID-1992 (1993)
[hereinafter MAR. 1993 ASIA WATCH REPORT]; Chinese Confirm Two Pro-Democracy Student Lead-
ers Still in Jail, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP File.
6 See generally LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE WITH CHI-
NESE CHARACTERISTICS: CHINA'S CRIMINAL PROCESS AND VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(1993) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMMITTEE REPORT].
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and association guaranteed by the Chinese Constitution remain the order
of the day. So, too, do lengthy periods of incommunicado administrative
detention, not subject to any formal legal procedures, for those who chal-
lenge the political orthodoxy. Documentation of the extensive use of
prison labor, operating under dismal conditions to produce profitable ex-
port goods, has focused attention on still another highly disturbing di-
mension of China's human rights situation.
Other human rights violations that have been particularly pro-
nounced during the past several years have included the persecution of
individuals for the exercise of religious freedom (guaranteed by the
PRC's Constitution7) and the suppression of emerging expressions of mi-
nority rights in Tibet and other "autonomous regions" of China. On the
religious front, the past few years have seen an intensification of the PRC
authorities' crackdown on independent religious groups, Christian, Bud-
dhist and Muslim, that refuse to practice their religion through official
government-supervised bodies.8 In Tibet there has been no let-up, and
even some intensification, of the persecution of peaceful advocates of in-
dependence as well as those engaged in religious and cultural activities
that threaten the dominance of PRC state control.9 A major crackdown
has also been underway in Inner Mongolia, where the authorities have
disbanded associations formed to promote Mongolian language and cul-
ture and arrested peaceful advocates of greater ethnic rights for
Mongolians in this "autonomous region" of China.10
The past few years have seen a newfound willingness of the Chinese
government to engage in a measure of dialogue and exchange with for-
eign countries on human rights issues. The government has allowed a
number of delegations from Australia, France, Britain and other coun-
tries to visit China on human rights missions in the past two years.
These groups have, however, been hampered by limitations on contacts
with individual dissidents and restricted access to judicial and prison fa-
cilities. They have had extensive discussions with relevant Chinese agen-
cies about human rights issues, and in some cases have issued detailed
7 XIANFA [Constitution] arts. 4, 36, 48 (P.R.C.).
8 ASIA WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN CHINA (1992); ASIA
WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CONTINUING RELIGIOUS REPRESSION IN CHINA (1993).
9 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, People's Republic of China: Repression in Tibet, Al Index: ASA
17/19/92, May 1992. See also INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN TIBET, submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Jan. 1992, re-
printed in Situation in Tibet" Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1992/37, at 50;
Nicholas D. Kristof, Communist Party Chief Calls for a Purge in Tibet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993,
at 11.
10 ASIA WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRACKDOWN IN INNER MONGOLIA (1991); ASIA
WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CONTINUING CRACKDOWN IN INNER MONGOLIA (1992).
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and highly critical reports. The Chinese government, for its part, sent
two academically oriented groups to the United States in the last quarter
of 1991, and also sent groups to several European and Asian countries in
1992, to discuss human rights with academic bodies, human rights orga-
nizations, and members of the legislative and executive branches in those
countries.
These initial efforts to address human rights questions through con-
tacts and discussion are highly preferable to the previous approach of the
Chinese government, which was to reject out of hand human rights as an
issue for bilateral or international debate. But while the government has
engaged in some measure of discussion of human rights, it continues both
to deny that well-documented violations occur in China, and to reassert
its position that China's domestic human rights record is an internal af-
fair not subject to outside action. In November 1991, the PRC State
Council issued a "Human Rights White Paper" that attempts, through a
variety of techniques ranging from propagandistic rhetoric to outright
distortion, to paint China as not only a leader in the guarantee of eco-
nomic and social rights for its citizens but as a country where the crimi-
nal justice system, the policy toward religious believers and minority
groups and other policies fully protect human rights."1 This report was
followed by two similar reports on the treatment of prisoners and the
situation in Tibet.12
The approach taken by Premier Li Peng in his January 31, 1992
speech to the U.N. Security Council and by the Chinese delegation at the
past several sessions of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights was to
express a willingness for dialogue on human rights "on an equal footing"
and up to a certain point, but to reject any criticism of human rights
conditions in any country-including China's own practices in Tibet and
elsewhere-as "interference in internal affairs" and a violation of state
sovereignty. 13 The PRC continued to press this position at the June 1993
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. 4
11 Information Office of the People's Republic of China State Council, Human Rights White
Paper, English translation in FBIS-CHI-91-225-S, Nov. 21, 1991, Chapters III, VI-VIII. For a cri-
tique of the White Paper's discussion of the Chinese criminal justice system, see LAWYER'S COM-
MITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CHINA'S WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITIQUE OF
CHAPTER 4 ON GUARANTEES OF HUMAN'RIGHTS IN CHINA'S JUDICIAL WORK (1992).
12 See generally Information Office of the PRC State Council, Criminal Reform in China, Aug.
1992; Information Office of the PRC State Council, Tibet-Its Ownership and Human Rights Situa-
tion, Sept. 1992, English translation in FBIS-CHI-92-197-S, Oct. 9, 1992.
13 U.N. ESCOR, 4th Sess., 3046th mtg. at 92-93, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3046 (prov. ed. 1992). See
Zhang Zhengdong, Unjust Cause Finds Little Support, BEUING REV., Mar. 22-23, 1993, at 10.
14 See Zhou Qingchang, Western Views on Human Rights Opposed, BEIJING REv., July 5-11,
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B. The United States Response
Daily violations of human rights in China continue to evoke con-
demnation and concern in the United States and elsewhere. Despite con-
certed efforts by the PRC government to shed its pariah status, its human
rights record remains a prominent concern of U.S. policy and a barrier to
China's full partnership in the community of nations. When, for exam-
ple, Beijing launched a massive campaign to be selected as host of the
2000 Olympics, U.S. Senator Bill Bradley (D-N.J.) mobilized Senate op-
position,15 and the House overwhelmingly adopted a resolution urging
the U.S. member of the International Olympic Committee to deny
China's bid. 6 But while human rights pressure has elicited some posi-
tive responses from Beijing, such as the periodic release of prominent
political prisoners, the international community's response to ongoing vi-
olations in China has thus far been ineffective in ending broad patterns of
abuse.
1. "Constructive Engagement"." The Bush Administration
This was notably true of the Bush Administration's policy of re-
newing political and economic ties with the PRC that had been sus-
pended following the Tiananmen incident, relying on what it termed "a
constructive policy of engagement with China" to address human rights
concerns.17 Then Secretary of State James Baker was acting in accord-
ance with that policy when, in November 1991, he visited China. The
circumstances surrounding Secretary Baker's visit seemed to underline
the inadequacy of the Bush Administration's China policy. Flouting the
U.S. government's asserted concern for human rights, the Chinese gov-
ernment detained two leading Chinese activists, Hou Xiaotian and jour-
nalist Dai Qing, to prevent them from meeting with the Secretary or his
staff during their visit. Although Dai Qing was subsequently allowed to
travel to the United States, she was temporarily prevented from reenter-
ing China when she sought to return home on May 30, 1992.18
1993, at 8; Proposals for Human Rights Protection and Promotion, BEUING REV., June 28-July 4,
1993, at 8.
15 See Lena H. Sun, China Pulls Out Stops in Olympic Bid: Political Factors Dominate in Beiing
Try for 2000 Games, With Chances Uncertain, WASH. POST, July 15, 1993, at D7.
16 Nicholas D. Kristof, Whither that Torch? China's Burning to Have It, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
1993, at A4.
17 Thomas L. Friedman, Bush Seeks Trade Benefits for China, N.Y. TiMEs, June 3, 1992, at
A13.
18 Ms. Dai was allowed to return to China on June 7, 1992, to return to the United States in
August 1992 and then to return permanently to China in early 1993. But the PRC apparently
intends to continue to deny reentry to other dissidents who travel abroad. A December 1992 docu-
ment issued internally by the PRC State Council reportedly establishes a blacklist of political dissi-
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While Secretary Baker raised human rights concerns during his
visit, he left with little in the way of concrete improvements to show for
his efforts. Although the Chinese government promised to stop exports
to the United States of prisoner-produced goods, it was subsequently
caught violating that pledge. 19 And while the government did produce a
promised accounting for some 800 political prisoners, it "provided just
the barest of information on each one, some of which has been proven
incorrect," according to congressional officials cited by The New York
Times.
20
Bush Administration officials acknowledged that Chinese authori-
ties made little progress in human rights in response to the Administra-
tion's efforts, and, according to The New York Times, "have taken
actions that almost seemed designed to 'rub our noses in it,' as one offi-
cial put it."2  Nonetheless, the policy of "constructive engagement" was
continued by President Bush through the end of his presidency.
2. Enforcement of Ban on Products Produced by Prisoners
The revelation in April 1991 that China was using prison labor on a
significant scale to generate export earnings was a major factor in reviv-
ing attention, both in the United States and elsewhere, to China's contin-
uing violations of human rights. In the United States, this issue raised a
legal problem under the provisions of a 1930 statute, the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act, which prohibits the import into the United States of products
of convict labor,2 2 and provided an important focus of debate on most-
favored-nation status for China's exports to the U.S. in the past two
years.23 Prompted by these revelations, the U.S. Customs Administra-
tion initiated an investigation into the prison labor allegations. In the
course of this investigation, specific Chinese products known to be pro-
duced with prison labor were barred from entering the United States.
In the wake of Secretary Baker's November 1991 visit to Beijing, it
was announced that the United States and China had reached basic
agreement on a memorandum of understanding that would allow the
U.S. Customs Service to make inspections in China to assure that prod-
ucts being exported to the U.S. were not produced with prison labor. It
dents who will not be allowed to reenter China after traveling abroad. Kang Tieshang, Banishment
and Exile: New Tactics for Dealing with Dissidents, CHINA F., Mar. 30, 1993, at 5.
19 See Bush is Setting the Bloodhounds on BeUing, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 23, 1991, at 36.
20 Friedman, supra note 17, at A13. See also AsIA WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EVI-
DENCE OF CRACKDOWN ON LABOR MOVEMENT MouNTs (1992).
21 Friedman, supra note 17.
22 (Smoot-Hawley) Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988).
23 See discussion infra part I.B.4.
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took another nine months before the agreement was actually signed,
however, and in the period since then Chinese authorities have allowed
U.S. Customs officials limited access to a handful of prison factories, viti-
ating the possibility of meaningfully monitoring compliance.24
3. The Congressional Challenge
During the Bush presidency Congress sought to invigorate U.S.
human rights policy toward China by imposing sanctions more stringent
than those adopted by the Administration.25 But President Bush repeat-
edly thwarted these efforts by using his veto power to block key legisla-
tion and by making liberal use of the presidential waiver authority built
into laws that Congress had enacted.26 Still, the very threat of legislated
sanctions elicited some human rights concessions from Beijing-notably
including the release of prominent political prisoners during key periods
of congressional debate-and concerned legislators helped maintain pub-
lic attention to human rights conditions in China. In larger perspective,
Congress' past efforts to fortify U.S. human rights policy toward China
laid the groundwork for a more constructive Executive policy under the
Clinton Administration, the basic contours of which are examined below.
Further, by forcing President Bush to justify his opposition, those initia-
tives triggered a rich public debate about U.S. human rights policy to-
ward China.
One of the most significant results of that debate has been a reexami-
nation of the relationship between human rights concerns and U.S. trade
policy. Congress has sought to promote human rights in China by har-
nessing the potentially powerful leverage available by virtue of the
United States' importance to China as its major trading partner. Inevita-
bly, these efforts have drawn the U.S.-based business community into
public debate about U.S. human rights policy toward China, and that
community has emerged as a singularly important voice in the debate.
4. Most Favored Nation Trading Status
The most visible and important congressional initiatives have fo-
cused on the annual determination about renewal of the PRC's most-
favored-nation (MFN) trading status, which gives China the lowest pos-
sible tariffs on its exports to the United States.27 Several factors have
24 Mike Jendrzejczyk, No Waffling on China, WASH. PosT, Feb. 16, 1993, at A13 (opinion
piece).
25 For analysis of those sanctions, see GETrNG DowN TO BUSINESS, supra note 1.
26 For discussion of the latter, see GFrING DowN TO BUSINESS, supra note 1.
27 Pursuant to a 1975 law, § 402 of the Trade Act of 1974, the President may not extend MFN
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elevated the importance of MFN status in the overall debate about U.S.
policy toward the PRC. First, the granting of MEFN status is far and
away the most significant economic lever available to the U.S. govern-
ment to promote human rights in the PRC. The United States is China's
largest overseas market, giving China a surplus of some $18 billion in its
trade with the United States in 1992.28 The loss of MFN status would
thus have a substantial impact on China's exports. Second, the U.S. busi-
ness community regards continuation of China's MFN status as vital to
its own economic interests. In its view, China's MFN status is the key-
stone of the U.S.-China economic relationship, and U.S. companies fear
that nonrenewal of that status would imperil their access to China's vast
and expanding market, as well as the continuation of investment and
other business opportunities in China. In consequence, the U.S. business
community has mobilized strong opposition to both congressional and
Executive efforts that could threaten continuation of China's MFN sta-
tus. Third, by law the President is required to notify Congress whether
he plans to renew China's MFN status on June 3 of each year-almost to
the day the anniversary of the massacre near Tiananmen Square.2 9 This
coincidence has, together with the first two factors, lent special promi-
nence to the annual debate over continuation of China's MFN status.
a. President Bush's Policy and Congressional Initiatives
In each year of his presidency following the Tiananmen incident,
President Bush notified Congress of his intention unconditionally to re-
new China's MFN status. Each time, his stance triggered congressional
efforts to link renewal to human rights improvements in the PRC. But
while the resulting clash between Congress and the Executive focused
public attention on deficiencies in the Administration's China policy,
President Bush was able each year to secure unconditional renewal of
China's MFN status despite congressional opposition. In 1990, the
status to countries with non-market economies that deny their citizens "the right or opportunity to
emigrate." 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (commonly referred to as the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade
Act of 1974). The President may waive this restriction if a waiver would "lead substantially to the
achievement of the objectives" of the law. The first provision of the law asserts that its object is "[t]o
assure the continued dedication of the United States to fundamental human rights," and MFN deter-
minations have sometimes taken into consideration human rights considerations unrelated to emi-
gration. Although China does not allow free emigration, the U.S. government has waived the
Jackson-Vanik restriction since 1980.
28 Daniel Southerland, Clinton Sending First Trade Delegation to China, WASH. POST, Feb. 27,
1993, at Cl.
29 The violent assault on pro-democracy activists in Beijing began on the night of June 3, 1989,
and continued through June 4. Most of the killings occurred on June 4, 1989, and the incident is now
widely referred to in China simply as "June 4."
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House passed two bills, one denying China MFN status and the other
extending MFN until 1991, with renewal then conditioned on the satis-
faction of strong human rights standards. The Senate did not consider
either bill before adjourning. In 1991 and in the Spring of 1992, both the
House and Senate enacted legislation attaching human rights conditions
to renewal of China's MFN status. But the Senate version failed to mar-
shal enough votes to override a presidential veto, issued in keeping with
the Bush Administration's "constructive engagement" policy.
In the Summer of 1992, several congressional leaders sought to
break the MFN impasse by introducing refined versions of earlier pro-
posals to attach human rights conditions. Following President Bush's
announcement on June 2, 1992 that he planned to extend MFN status to
China for another year, a modified version of a proposal developed by the
human rights organization Asia Watch was introduced by Rep. Nancy
Pelosi (D.-California) and Rep. Don Pease (D.-Ohio) in the House of
Representatives and by Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D.-Maine)
in the Senate. Each of these Congresspersons had been chief architects of
the conditional approach to MFN in the past. The initiative abandoned
the "all or nothing" approach built into existing MFN legislation, which
had forced Congress to choose between unconditional renewal of MFN
on the one hand and, on the other, non-renewal or renewal with condi-
tions that would apply across the board-requiring penalization of
China's reform-oriented privatizing economic sectors along with all
others. The legislation sought to impose measurable and effective human
rights conditions-the release of political prisoners, an end to religious
persecution, and the like. China's failure to meet such conditions would
result in the loss of MFN benefits only for exports of PRC state enter-
prises, from which the repressive regime derives the most significant
benefit.3a
Under these bills, exports that could be demonstrated to emanate
from non-state enterprises-private businesses, collectives, and enter-
prises with foreign investment-would not lose the trade benefits. The
legislation thus sought to penalize the government for failing to improve
the human rights situation, while minimizing the risk of harming sectors
of China's economy and society that contribute to liberalization. Signifi-
cantly, too, this approach addressed one basis for opposition within the
30 Although economic authority in the PRC has become significantly diffused and products
whose export is monopolized by one particular state agency have diminished in number and in
percentage of China's trade, state enterprises at one level or another of the Chinese trade structure-
whether central or local-still account for a significant proportion of China's exports to the United
States and other countries. See generally NICHOLAS R. LARDY, FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC
REFORM IN CHINA, 1978-1990 (1992).
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business community to earlier efforts to attach human rights conditions
to MFN renewal-the potential loss of tariff benefits for products pro-
duced by joint ventures between U.S. and Chinese businesses. Like its
predecessors, this legislative initiative passed both the House and Senate
but failed in the Senate to override President Bush's September 28, 1992
veto by a margin of seven votes.31
On April 21, 1993, Congresswoman Pelosi and Senator Mitchell in-
troduced in the House and Senate, respectively, bills patterned on the
legislation they had introduced last year, with various technical refine-
ments. Under this legislation, failure by the PRC to meet specific human
rights conditions would result the following year in denial of MFN treat-
ment to Chinese state enterprise products. The proposed human rights
conditions included continued release of Chinese citizens detained as a
result of nonviolent expression of political and/or religious beliefs, un-
restricted immigration of PRC citizens desiring to leave China for polit-
ical, religious or other valid reasons, and compliance by China with the
August 7, 1992 Memorandum of Undertaking on Prohibiting Import and
Export Trade in Prison Labor Products.32
b. President Clinton's Executive Order
By the time these bills were introduced, a new Administration had
taken office. Although President Clinton had not yet made known what
action he would take on renewal of China's MFN status, it seemed likely
that he would reverse his predecessor's policy of unconditional renewal.
As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton had indicated that he was likely
to support some form of human rights conditionality.3 3 During the early
months of the Clinton presidency, key members of his administration
repeatedly indicated the President's intention to link continued MFN
treatment to human rights improvements in China.34
31 The Senate voted to sustain President Bush's veto by a count of 59-40 on Oct. 1, 1992. 138
CONG. REC. S15957 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1992).
32 139 CONG. REC. S4662, H2023 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1993).
33 See Jendrzejczyk, supra note 24.
34 In his first congressional testimony after being confirmed as U.S. Trade Representative,
Mickey Kantor noted the repeated failure of the Bush Administration to impose conditions on re-
newal of MFN for China, and stated that "the Clinton Administration will address all of these
concerns - human rights, [arms] proliferation, and trade - and we will address them aggressively."
Michael Chugani, U.S. Takes Tough Stand on Trade, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 11, 1993, at 2.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher told a congressional committee in March that "it is my hope
that we can go forward with MFN this year but conditioned on [China] making very substantial
progress." Michael Chugani, U.S. Spells Out MFN Renewal Conditions, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 12, 1993, at 2. In his Senate confirmation hearing, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia
and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord said that "conditional MFN is the position of the President and we
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On May 28, 1993, President Clinton issued an Executive Order that
continued China's MFN status for another year, but set forth human
rights conditions that China would have to satisfy to qualify for renewal
in 1994. The Executive Order identifies seven human rights criteria rele-
vant to the renewal determination. Only two are cast as absolute require-
ments, and both of these criteria relate to preexisting requirements of
U.S. law. The first, that renewal "will substantially promote the freedom
of emigration objectives" of the Trade Act of 1974, in effect restates the
criterion for renewal of China's MFN status already imposed by that
law.35 The second, that "China is complying with the 1992 bilateral
agreement between the United States and China concerning prison la-
bor," by its terms incorporates a preexisting commitment, which in turn
implements the Smoot-Hawley law discussed in Part I.B.2. China is re-
quired to demonstrate only "overall, significant progress" in meeting the
other five criteria, which relate to such goals as the release of political
prisoners and access of international humanitarian agencies to PRC
prisons.
Against a recent history of assurance to Chinese leaders that,
whatever Congress may say or do, the U.S. President will stand by them,
the MFN conditionality imposed by President Clinton signals a serious
U.S. intention to demand meaningful human rights improvements in ex-
change for continued trade privileges, despite the generality with which
the human rights conditions are expressed in the Order. At the same
time, the leader-to-leader approach also is better suited to the type of
flexibility that may be necessary in addressing the complex issues that are
sure to arise during implementation of a conditional MFN approach.
But if presidentially-mandated conditionality is preferable, it remains de-
sirable for Congress to sustain pressure to move the Administration
clearly in the direction to which the Executive Order points.36 Whether
the policy established in President Clinton's Order is effective will de-
pend, above all, on actions taken by the Administration in the months
ahead. In particular, the Administration should communicate to Chi-
nese authorities clear standards by which the PRC's compliance with the
Executive Order criteria will be evaluated, and should actively press for
progress in satisfying those standards. Further, as elaborated below, the
Executive Order opens a unique window of opportunity for the Adminis-
wish to go forward on that basis, depending on events." Susumu Awanohara, China Consensus, FAR
E. ECON. REv., Apr. 22, 1993, at 13.
35 See supra note 27.
36 Congress has made clear its support for President Clinton's initiative by overwhelmingly vot-
ing against a bill that would have superseded the Executive Order and immediately terminated
China's MFN status. H.R.J. Res. 208, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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tration to mobilize U.S. investors in China to act as a constructive force
for human rights progress.
c. The Role of the Business Community
While views within the business community have not been mono-
lithic, U.S. companies that invest in China have, on the whole, strongly
opposed efforts to attach human rights conditions to renewal of China's
MFN status. The loss of MFN status would directly affect some U.S.
companies engaged in joint venture operations in China, resulting in
some cases in a multi-fold increase in tariffs for joint-venture products
destined for a U.S. market. But the chief concern of U.S. companies is
that termination of China's MFN status would provoke retaliation
against U.S. companies that invest in and send exports to China. U.S.
companies have already experienced significant difficulties penetrating
the China market when faced with competition from exporters in Japan
and Europe, who enjoy a substantial advantage by virtue of their govern-
ments' export-assistance programs and often more flexible pricing poli-
cies. U.S. companies fear that political tension between China and the
United States could only exacerbate these endemic commercial problems.
Demonstrating a sophisticated grasp of the U.S. political process,
the PRC government exploited these apprehensions in the period preced-
ing President Clinton's decision about renewal of China's MFN status.
As the MFN debate approached, Chinese trade delegations went on a
buying frenzy throughout the United States, spending more than $800
million for jetliners, $160 million for cars, and $200 million for oil explo-
ration equipment. After years of favoring French and other non-Ameri-
can telecommunications companies for entry into this key part of the
China market, the PRC concluded a major agreement with AT&T,
worth several billion dollars, for telecommunications equipment and
technology. China reached a tentative agreement with Hughes Space
Communications Co. to build communications satellites worth $750 mil-
lion. Though characteristically frugal, Chinese representatives offered to
buy U.S. steel at slightly higher prices than those charged in Japan and
Korea."7 Throughout this process, China made it clear that it expected
U.S. companies to lobby for continuation of its MFN status in return for
its purchases. U.S. companies are "regularly threatened with cancella-
tion of orders or loss of future deals if China loses its preferred status,"
according to business sources cited in The Washington Post.38 The
37 Michael Weisskopf, Backbone of the New China Lobby: U.S. Firms, WASH. POsr, June 14,
1993, at A12.
38 Id.
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message was not lost on U.S. companies, who mounted a campaign of
unprecedented scope and intensity to secure unconditional renewal of
China's MFN status in the period leading up to President Clinton's de-
termination on this issue.
By letter dated May 12, 1993, some 370 companies and business
associations, representing virtually every U.S. company active in China,
stated their case to President Clinton:
.... We represent companies that exported products to China worth nearly
$7.5 billion in 1992, and that employ an estimated 157,000 American work-
ers producing those goods. We represent the aerospace industry which ex-
ported products to China worth over $2 billion in 1992, and which expects
China to purchase approximately $40 billion in new aircraft over the next
twenty years. We represent the farmers whose largest market for wheat is
China .... America's economic stake in maintaining trade relations with
China is high. Withdrawing or placing further conditions on MFN could
terminate the large potential benefits of the trading relationship, lead the
Chinese to engage in retaliatory actions that would harm U.S. exporters,
farmers, laborers and consumers. ... 39
But while emphasizing U.S. economic stakes, the signatories to this letter
endorsed the human rights goals of the Clinton Administration's policy
toward Beijing. Echoing arguments by spokesmen for business interests
that had become increasingly common during previous debates about re-
newal of China's MFN status, they asserted:
We in the business community... believe that our continued commercial
interaction fuels positive elements for change in Chinese society. The ex-
pansion of trade and free market reforms has strengthened the pro-demo-
cratic forces in China .... 40
Significantly, the letter expressed agreement with the President "that the
Chinese must continue to make progress in... human rights.
'41
However much the business community may have hoped to avoid
MFN conditionality, it now has a substantial interest in assuring that
China makes sufficient progress on human rights to avoid termination of
its MFN status in 1994. In this setting, U.S. policy would be most effec-
tive if the political leadership in Washington actively encouraged U.S.
investors in China to promote human rights there. The Administration
should build on the asserted commitment to its human rights goals ex-
pressed in the above-quoted letter by urging the signatories actively to
promote human rights progress in China. While some Administration
39 Letter from Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade to President Bill Clinton (May 12, 1993),
at 1-2.
40 Id. at 1.
41 Id.
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officials have already done so in general terms,4 2 these efforts would be
most effective if those same officials developed concrete proposals for
measures that U.S. companies can take to promote human rights in
China, and urged the chief executive officers of major U.S. investors to
undertake those measures or others more suited to the nature of their
business relationships in the PRC.
5. Code of Conduct Legislation
While MFN conditionality has dominated the U.S. human rights
policy debate about China, a little-noticed legislative initiative has intro-
duced a new, and potentially vital, plank in the policy options. Senator
Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) and Representative Jolene Unsoeld
(D-Washington) have agreed to sponsor bills, in the Senate and House
respectively, to establish a voluntary code of conduct governing the Chi-
nese operations of U.S. companies. By directly focusing on the role of
U.S. corporations in addressing human rights concerns in China, this leg-
islation sharpens the broader debate about corporate responsibility vis-a-
vis human rights violations in the PRC.
a. Background and Overview
The Kennedy and Unsoeld initiatives build upon a similar effort by
then-Congressman John Miller (R.-Washington), who on June 21, 1991,
introduced legislation43 that would have established a set of human
rights principles governing the conduct of U.S. companies with invest-
ments and other business operations in the PRC. On October 30, 1991,
the bill passed the House as part of the Omnibus Export Amendment
Act of 1991 and was subsequently taken up in a joint House-Senate con-
ference. A conference bill passed the Senate on October 8, 1992, but
failed to come to a vote in the House for reasons unrelated to the code of
conduct itself. The discussion that follows is based upon the original
Miller bill.'
The proposed code-of-conduct bill does not seek to impose sanctions
42 During a briefing on the Executive Order, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord, said "[i]t would be very helpful indeed if the business community
lobbied the Chinese government to make progress in these areas as effectively as they are lobbying
Congress and the President. I think it would help American policy... [if U.S. business leaders]
would take actions and express their views to the Chinese on human rights concerns .... " Winston
Lord, Most Favored Nation Trading Status to China, May 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Reuter Transcript Report File (State Department on-the-Record Briefing).
43 H.R. 3489, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
44 It is the authors' understanding that the offices of both Senator Kennedy and Representative
Unsoeld are likely to introduce legislation patterned on the original Miller bill.
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on China for failing to meet human rights standards, nor does it discour-
age U.S. businesses from investing in China. Instead, the bill asks com-
panies with a significant presence in China to adhere to a set of basic
human rights principles, on a "best efforts" basis, in the course of their
operations.
In this way, the proposed law seeks to assure that U.S. business ac-
tivities in the PRC do not inadvertently encourage or themselves contrib-
ute to repressive practices, but instead make a constructive contribution
to human rights. Under the proposed law, these goals would be pro-
moted by encouraging U.S. nationals conducting industrial cooperation
projects in China to adhere to nine principles that have the cumulative
effect of (1) assuring that U.S. businesses operating in China extend to
their foreign employees the same type of minimum human rights protec-
tions that they have long been required to provide to employees in the
United States, such as protections against discrimination on the basis of
religious beliefs, political views, gender and ethnic or national back-
ground; (2) assuring that the premises of U.S. business operations are not
used in a fashion that violates fundamental rights (for example, the pro-
posed code of conduct includes a pledge to discourage compulsory polit-
ical indoctrination programs from taking place on the premises of U.S.
nationals' industrial cooperation projects in the PRC); and (3) bringing
the considerable-and indeed unique-influence of the U.S. business
community to bear to promote an end to flagrant violations of human
rights (for example, the proposed code of conduct urges U.S. nationals to
use their access to Chinese officials informally to raise cases of individu-
als detained solely because of their nonviolent expression of political
views). 45
There are no penalties for failure to comply with the principles, and
in this respect compliance with the code depends upon the voluntary ef-
forts of U.S. companies. The bill itself is framed as a "sense of Congress
45 Somewhat analogous codes have been developed to promote human rights in other countries.
The best known of these are the Sullivan Principles for businesses operating in South Africa. First
developed in 1977 and subsequently amplified, the Sullivan Principles were for many years adopted
by corporations on a voluntary basis. In 1985, President Reagan issued an executive order that
included a provision forbidding U.S. export assistance to any U.S. firm with 25 or more employees
that had not adopted the principles enumerated in the Sullivan code. The Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986, which superseded President Reagan's executive order, incorporated the Sullivan Principles by,
inter alia, requiring "[a]ny national of the United States that employs more than 25 persons in South
Africa [to] take the necessary steps to insure that the Code of Conduct [based on the Sullivan Princi-
ples] is implemented with respect to the employment of those persons." Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986 § 207(a), 22 U.S.C. § 5034(a) (1988). Another precedent is the MacBride
Principles, which set forth employment standards for companies operating in Northern Ireland. A
number of city and state governments have enacted laws supporting the MacBride Principles (by, for
example, threatening to bar firms that do not adhere to the Principles from city contracts).
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that any United States economic cooperation project in the People's Re-
public of China or Tibet should adhere to." "Adherence" is defined as
"agreeing to implement the principles set forth" in the bill, "implement-
ing those principles by taking good faith measures with respect to each
such principle," and "reporting accurately to the Department of State on
the measures taken to implement those principles."
The bill imposes only two "requirements" on U.S. companies: 1) the
U.S. parent company of a PRC investment project must register with the
Secretary of State and indicate whether it will implement the principles;
and 2) the parent company must report on an annual basis to the Depart-
ment of State describing the China project's adherence to the code. The
Secretary of State is directed to review these reports to determine
whether the project is adhering to the principles, and may request addi-
tional information to supplement company reports. The Secretary is fur-
ther required to submit an annual report to Congress and the Secretariat
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) describing the level of adherence to the principles by U.S. com-
pany projects in China.'
The code-of-conduct bill sets forth a constructive approach to what
has often seemed an intractable problem of competing policy goals. In
effect, the bill takes up the claim of the U.S. business community, repeat-
edly asserted in the context of annual debates over renewal of China's
MFN status, that U.S. corporations can more effectively promote human
rights improvements in China by remaining an active presence there than
by severing or contracting ties. By encouraging U.S. corporations to ad-
here to basic human rights principles in China, the proposed law seeks to
assure that U.S. investment does in fact have a constructive impact on
human rights in China. At the same time, the bill would assure that U.S.
investment in China does not undermine U.S. human rights goals by in-
advertently lending support to the PRC government's ongoing violations
of fundamental rights.
Nevertheless, while some members of the U.S. business community
have expressed support for the principles established in the legislation,
many others have spoken out against it. The critics have raised two prin-
cipal objections. The first, in essence, is that Congress should not dictate
business practices to U.S. companies operating in China, and that the
latter should not appear to be the "lackeys" of U.S. policy. According to
one press account, a letter to U.S. Congresspersons from the American
46 The Secretary is also directed to encourage OECD nations to promote similar principles. An
international approach to business efforts on human rights is essential if such efforts are to achieve
meaningful success. See discussion infra part III.C.
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Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong charged that the bill "practically
[makes U.S. business] appear to be agents of the U.S. government."' 7
In response to this concern, U.S. businessman John Kamm, a for-
mer Chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong,
approached the Chamber with a proposal for it to adopt the legislation's
principles on a voluntary basis. Similarly, the office of Congressman
Miller, who introduced the original version of the code-of-conduct legis-
lation, held discussions with the U.S.-China Business Council in Wash-
ington, the leading U.S. organization representing U.S. investors in
China, about the possibility of the Council's taking a similar step. In
each case, business groups were urged to avoid congressionally-legislated
principles by adopting similar principles themselves. None of these ef-
forts has met with success, however. Instead, both the Chamber and the
U.S.-China Business Council have raised numerous objections to the
principles on substantive grounds.
The general tenor of substantive objections by members of the busi-
ness community is that the code would require U.S. companies to take
action that may be "impractical" or provocative, and that could jeopard-
ize their position in China. This line of objection, which is more pro-
nounced with respect to some provisions of the code than others, has
often been backed by the claim that compliance with the bill's principles
would require U.S. companies to violate Chinese law or policy.
A close examination of the proposed legislation suggests that these
concerns are unwarranted. As detailed in the following section-by-sec-
tion analysis of the code-of-conduct bill, nothing in the bill requires U.S.
companies to violate Chinese law. Further, the bill grants companies
wide leeway to avoid taking action that could imperil their business rela-
tionships in China, urging only that they endeavor, on a "best efforts"
basis, to comply with and promote basic international standards in their
Chinese operations.
b. Section-by-Section Analysis of Proposed Legislation
(1) Pursuant to Section 941(b)(1), U.S. Economic Cooperation Projects
in China Should
SEEK TO ENSURE THAT DECISIONS CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC COOPERATION PROJECT DO NOT ENTAIL DIS-
CRIMINATION BASED ON SEX, RELIGION, ETHNIC OR NATIONAL BACK-
GROUND, POLITICAL BELIEF, NONVIOLENT POLITICAL ACTIVITY, OR
POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP.
This provision seeks to assure that the employment practices of U.S.
47 S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 9, 1991 (article in authors' possession).
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companies in China respect the internationally-recognized right to non-
discrimination. Perhaps no right is more fundamental than this one in
international human rights law.48
Further, this provision asks U.S. companies to implement principles
that are also recognized under the law of the PRC itself and which have,
in fact, often been emphasized in the Chinese government's own state-
ments about its human rights policy. The PRC's "Human Rights White
Paper," for example, devotes considerable attention to China's protection
of women's rights, the achievement of equality for women in the work-
place and society; freedom of religious belief and equal opportunity for
members of all religious and ethnic and minority groups.4 9 All of these
rights have clear bases in the PRC Constitution5 ° and specific legislation,
including a new law on women's rights enacted by the National People's
Congress in 1992. 5" As the Chinese themselves admit, however, equal
opportunity for women and ethnic minorities remains more a matter of
principle than of reality in many sectors of the Chinese economy. Ac-
cordingly, the U.S. business efforts envisioned by this principle could
help further important goals recognized by both Chinese and interna-
tional law.
As far as "political belief" and "nonviolent political activity" are
concerned, the Chinese Constitution enshrines "freedom of expression
and association."52 As noted earlier, however, the use of both judicial
and administrative methods to penalize the nonviolent expression of
views remains prevalent in the PRC, and represents one of the leading
violations of internationally protected human rights in the country.53
Further, Chinese citizens detained because of nonviolent political
activity are frequently penalized by discrimination in employment even
after they are cleared of charges or exonerated from criminal penalties
following conviction. 54 Pressure for employers not to hire or to dis-
charge such people has extended to foreign joint venture companies. For
48 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 55, 59 Stat. 1031, 1045-46 (signed June 26, 1945; entered into
force Oct. 24, 1945), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 1-2, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/
810, at 71 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, arts. 2(1), G.A. Res. 2200, 26,
U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp., No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (adopted
Dec. 16, 1966 and reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR].
49 Human Rights White Paper, supra note 11, at Chapters III, VI-VIII.
50 XIANFA [Constitution] arts. 4, 36, 48 (P.R.C.).
51 The Law of the PRC Protecting Women's Rights and Interests, adopted April 3, 1992, Eng-
lish translation in FBIS-CHI-92-072-S, Apr. 14, 1992, at 17.
52 XIANFA [Constitution] art. 35 (P.R.C.).
53 See generally LAWYERS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6.
54 See INT'L LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Human Rights in China: An Update (In Brief No.
43) at 5 (Nov. 1991).
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example, Zhou Liwu, who was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for
his involvement in the 1989 democracy movement, found employment
with a Taiwanese joint venture company in Guangzhou City after trying
to find employment with various Chinese enterprises, which refused to
hire him in light of his "problematic personal history." Although his
supervisor was so pleased with Zhou's work that he soon put Zhou in
charge of personnel matters, Zhou was suddenly fired at the end of his
first month. Zhou's supervisor explained that he had come under so
much pressure from the government for hiring Zhou that he had no
choice but to fire him. According to Asia Watch, Zhou subsequently
found other positions in joint venture companies, but was always fired
within the first month because of renewed government pressure. Zhou
finally "gave up and went back to his home village, where he now scrapes
out a living as a peasant.1
55
Finally, as regards "political party membership," PRC statements
have emphasized the concept of "equality before the law" for all citizens
and the elimination of "special privileges" for any sector of society, in-
eluding Communist Party members.5 6 Once again, however, and by the
PRC's own admission, Communist Party members and other well-con-
nected individuals continue to benefit from such privileges. Indeed, the
Chinese government welcomes foreign business involvement in China in
part as a source of expertise on managing a business operation in a man-
ner that emphasizes economic efficiency rather than the fiat of powerful
individuals. Thus, by implementing the first principle of the proposed
code, U.S. companies would be acting in accord with ideals enshrined in
China's own law and policy, as well as with U.S. and international
human rights standards.
Like other provisions of the code, the manner in which this principle
is framed-"seek to ensure that decisions concerning employment.., do
not entail"-avoids placing unrealistic demands on U.S. companies in
China. U.S. investors may not always have complete control over em-
ployment decisions in their investment projects, depending upon such
factors as the size and percentage of their investment in a project, the
relative strength of their Chinese partner (which sometimes exerts strong
pressure for the take-over of existing employees by a new joint venture)
and the cooperation of local agencies." At the same time, however, the
55 ASIA WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ANTHEMS OF DEFEAT: CRACKDOWN IN HUNAN
PROVINCE 1989-92, at 61-62 (1992) [hereinafter ANTHEMS OF DEFEAT].
56 See XIANFA [Constitution] art. 33 (P.R.C.).
57 Geographic factors and differences in local labor regulations also may affect the degree to
which U.S. companies can successfully promote fair employment standards. For example, in the
southern special economic zones, foreign investment projects are typically granted considerable au-
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annual evaluation of compliance with the code should interpret the "seek
to ensure" language in a manner that assures good faith efforts by U.S.
companies. In particular, a company that has a wholly-owned invest-
ment project in the PRC, with a large degree of control over the manage-
ment and operations, should be held to a high standard of effort.
(2) Pursuant to Section 941(b)(2), U.S. Economic Cooperation Projects
in China Should'
ENSURE, THROUGH CONSULTATION WITH RELEVANT GOVERNMENT
AUTHORITIES WHERE APPROPRIATE, THAT METHODS OF PRODUCTION
USED IN THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC COOPERATION PROJECT DO NOT
POSE AN UNNECESSARY PHYSICAL DANGER TO WORKERS, TO NEIGHBOR-
ING POPULATIONS AND PROPERTY, AND TO THE SURROUNDING
ENVIRONMENT.
Like the first principle, this provision dovetails with extensive PRC
legislation and policy on labor safety and environmental protection. 58
Indeed, a stated goal of the PRC's effort to attract foreign investment is
to improve labor safety and environmental protection techniques, as well
as to learn the management skills essential to achieving these goals.
Despite such legislation, however, working conditions in China are a
source of enormous concern in many areas, as the government itself ac-
knowledges. A recent survey by the Provincial Health Administration in
Guangdong Province found that more than 70 percent of joint venture
firms in the province expose their workers to serious health risks.59 The
situation in Guangdong "mirrors a national trend of foreign-funded firms
exploiting China's fledgling labour and health protection legislation to
bring in potentially harmful production equipment and materials," ac-
cording to China Daily."
The proposed provision is also consonant with international stan-
dards protecting human rights of workers. Those standards, examined in
Part III, include assurances of occupational safety and a healthy working
environment.
tonomy over local employment decisions, while companies in Beijing generally operate in a tighter
regulatory environment. See generally HILARY K. JOSEPHS, LABOR LAW IN CHINA: CHOICE AND
RESPONSIBILITY (1990); FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUB-
LIC OF CHINA 199-269 (Michael J. Moser ed., 1987).
58 For a discussion of PRC labor laws and policies, see JOSEPHS, supra note 57.
59 Employers Ignoring Workers' Safety, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 9, 1993, at 3.
60 Id.
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(3) Pursuant to Sections 941(b)(3) and (4), U.S. Economic
Cooperation Projects in China Should
ENSURE THAT NO CONVICT OR FORCED LABOR UNDER PENAL SANCTIONS
IS KNOWINGLY USED IN THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC PROJECT, and
ENSURE THAT NO GOODS THAT ARE MINED, PRODUCED, OR MANUFAC-
TURED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY CONVICT OR FORCED LABOR UNDER
PENAL SANCTIONS ARE KNOWINGLY USED IN THE UNITED STATES ECO-
NOMIC COOPERATION PROJECT.
Since in many cases the products of U.S. investment projects in
China are exported in whole or part to the U.S. market, often through or
with the assistance of the U.S. partner, compliance with the principle will
promote compliance with the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act discussed
in Part I.B.2. As noted, enforcement of that law has been fraught with
problems, despite the fact that violations of the law have received con-
certed international attention in the past two years.
While thus lending much-needed support to efforts to enforce com-
pliance with the Smoot-Hawley law, these provisions of the code-of-con-
duct bill place no undue burden on U.S. companies. The word
"knowingly" takes account of situations in which Chinese authorities
have sought to disguise the use of "reform through labor" camps for
economic purposes by giving two names to labor camp and prison facto-
ries, one indicating its nature as a correctional institution, the other re-
sembling the name of a normal industrial facility. This approach
reportedly has at times obscured the prison labor source of some of the
production in U.S. companies' joint venture operations in China.61 At
the same time, however, the "knowingly" standard should be interpreted
to assure that U.S. companies make concerted and bona fide efforts to
police the source of products used in or produced by their economic
projects in China. While the prohibition of prison labor would imple-
ment the Smoot-Hawley law, the provisions of the code-of-conduct bill
regarding forced labor would also implement well-established principles
of international labor law.62
(4) Pursuant to Section 941(b)(5), US. Economic Cooperation Projects
in China Should
UNDERTAKE TO PROTECT FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION
AMONG THE EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC COOPERA-
61 The Joseph E. Seagram company reportedly was dismayed to discover in March 1991 that
prison labor was used by the contractor it had hired to assemble boxes for its wine coolers produced
in China. A number of other companies have had similar experiences. China's Ugly Export Secret:
Prison Labor, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 22, 1991, at 42.
62 See discussion infra part III.
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TION PROJECT, AND TO FOSTER POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONSULTA-
TION BETWEEN EMPLOYEES AND MANAGEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ECONOMIC COOPERATION PROJECT.
The second part of this provision reflects the PRC's own stated
goals for encouraging foreign investment. Those goals include not only
the acquisition of foreign funds and technology, but also the development
of skills and business practices involved in managing and running an effi-
cient, modem enterprise. It is for this reason that the PRC's investment
laws and policies have both allowed and encouraged foreign companies
to station long-term management staff on the premises of economic coop-
eration projects. Free interaction between foreign and Chinese staff of a
joint venture is obviously essential if these goals are to be met. In the
post-Tiananmen period, the relatively open atmosphere that had emerged
in the 1980s in Sino-foreign business projects sometimes became strained
as Chinese employees were chided or even disciplined by Party authori-
ties for having too much contact with their foreign counterparts, giving
foreign managers too much information, going too far to accommodate
the business needs of foreigners, and the like.6" Fearing that extensive
contact with members of the foreign business community might be a cat-
alyst for what the Chinese call "peaceful evolution," hard-line members
of the Chinese leadership have sought to restrict contacts between Chi-
nese and foreigners.
Another key aspect of this provision, of course, involves freedom of
association and assembly of Chinese staff of a venture. Like other provi-
sions of the code of conduct bill, this principle is based upon well-estab-
lished international law protecting both associational rights and the right
to freedom of assembly."
Under this provision, a company would, inter alia, be expected to
intervene if Chinese authorities interfered with a study group formed by
its Chinese staff outside of working hours-whether to study computer
science or foreign political theory. It should be reiterated, and perhaps
emphasized in light of criticisms from the business community that the
code of conduct might require U.S. companies to violate Chinese law,
that the PRC Constitution protects citizens' "freedom of association and
assembly."6 5 At the same time, however, the Chinese government has
systematically violated these rights. Chinese trade union law undercuts
63 The Chinese deputy manager of a Sino-U.S. joint venture with which Mr. Gelatt is familiar,
for instance, was subjected to extensive questioning and harassment by local Party officials for hav-
ing been too helpful to the American partner in obtaining a tax concession from the local authorities.
See discussion infra part III.
64 See discussion infra part III.
65 XIANFA [Constitution] art. 35 (P.R.C.).
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the constitutional protections as they would generally be understood
under international law by requiring unions to be formed under the aus-
pices of national and local Party-run associations, and does not allow the
formation of independent unions.66 Further, although the constitutional
protections as enunciated in China must, if they are to mean anything,
encompass the type of study groups referred to above, this very type of
activity has been subject to repeated interference by Chinese authorities,
both in workplaces and in other fora. In some cases they have led to
arrest and prosecution. Since mid-1992, the Chinese authorities have ar-
rested a number of individuals in academia and other institutions for at-
tempting to form human rights and pro-democracy study groups.67
(5) Pursuant to Section 941(b)(6), U.S. Economic Cooperation Projects
in China Should
PROMOTE THE TRAINING OF EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED STATES ECO-
NOMIC COOPERATION PROJECT, IN PARTICULAR THE TRAINING OF CHI-
NESE EMPLOYEES IN MANAGERIAL POSITIONS IN THE PRINCIPLES OF
MARKET-ORIENTED BUSINESS MANAGEMENT.
As indicated above, this provision reflects the PRC's own goals for
the presence of foreign investors on its soil, as well as the goals of U.S.
business in seeking to establish successful and profitable enterprises in the
PRC. As an initiative urging U.S. companies to promote managerial
training for non-U.S. employees abroad, this provision also has precedent
in the Sullivan Principles for the conduct of U.S. businesses in South
Africa. The Sullivan code, which was incorporated into congressional
legislation in 1986,68 similarly committed U.S. companies to undertake
affirmative measures for the managerial training of black and non-white
South African employees.
Promotion of managerial training as an element of human rights
strategy rests upon a two-fold rationale about the leverage of U.S. busi-
ness abroad: 1) economic forces have a unique capacity to erode the so-
cial basis of human rights violations and 2) with its relative autonomy, a
U.S.-owned or -managed workplace provides an arena in which a com-
pany's efforts can be most effective. While the first premise has been the
subject of substantial debate, it has been a central contention of the U.S.
business community in arguing against divestment in South Africa and in
opposing revocation of MFN status for China. Accordingly, while re-
flecting the economic objectives of both the PRC and U.S. business in
66 Trade Union Law of the PRC, adopted Apr. 3, 1992, art. 34, translation in FBIS-CHI-92-072-
S, Apr. 14, 1992, at 8 [hereinafter Trade Union Law); JOSEPHS, supra note 57, at 99.
67 MAR. 1993 ASIA WATCH REPORT, supra note 5.
68 See supra note 45.
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China, this provision recognizes and implements U.S. investors' favored
strategy for human rights intervention.
The second premise is largely supported by the accomplishments of
the Sullivan Principles in South Africa. While the broader impact of the
Sullivan code in ending apartheid is disputed, the code has had signifi-
cant, if limited, effects in the companies that have adhered to it. By the
end of 1984 advocates of the Principles pointed to the following changes
within the workplaces of adherents: the end of discrimination on the
company property of all signatories; equal pay for equal work by all sig-
natories; and common medical, pension and insurance plans available to
all workers, regardless of race.69 Further, by 1986 Sullivan signatories
had spent more than $250 million in social programs, including training
and educational projects. 10 Since then, signatories have continued to
achieve increases in the percentage of managerial and supervisory posi-
tions filled by non-white South Africans.'
(6) Pursuant to Section 941(b)(7), U.S. Economic Cooperation Projects
in China Should
UNDERTAKE TO PROTECT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FOR THE EMPLOYEES
OF THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC COOPERATION PROJECT, INCLUDING
THE FREEDOM TO SEEK, RECEIVE, AND IMPART INFORMATION AND IDEAS
OF ALL KINDS.
As with other provisions of the proposed code of conduct, imple-
mentation of this principle would not require U.S. businesses to apply
standards that are antithetical to China's own law and stated policy. In
the "White Paper" on human rights and in numerous other pronounce-
ments on this issue over the years, PRC authorities have stated that Chi-
nese citizens enjoy the constitutionally-protected right to hold and
express their views,72 and have insisted that mere expression does not
give rise to criminal prosecution. As indicated, however, the reality has
69 Roy A. Schotland, Divergent Investing of Pension Funds and University Endowments: Key
Points About the Pragmatics; and Two Current Case Studies, in DISINVESTMENT: IS IT LEGAL? Is IT
MORAL? IS IT PRODUCTIVE?: AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICIZING INVESTMENT DECISIONS 31, 63
(John H. Langbein et al., 1985).
70 RICHARD W. HULL, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN SOUTH AFRICA 336 (1990).
71 An assessment of compliance with the Principles prepared by Arthur D. Little notes that the
percentage of whites supervised by non-white South Africans increased from 3.5% in 1985 to 10.5%
in 1991. The data on hiring practices also reflect significant changes: the percentage of managerial
level vacancies filled by non-white South Africans increased from 14% in 1985 to 27% in 1991; non-
whites filling vacated supervisory positions rose from 41% to 60% for the same period. ARTHUR D.
LITILE, INC., FIFTEENTH REPORT ON THE SIGNATORY COMPANIES TO THE STATEMENT OF PRIN-
CIPLES FOR SOUTH AFRICA 13, 15.
72 XIANFA [Constitution] art. 35 (P.R.C.); Human Rights White Paper, supra note 11, at Chap-
ter IV.
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been quite different. In addition to the prominent cases of dissident
figures imprisoned in connection with the Tiananmen events, there is a
continuing pattern of prosecutions and administrative detentions for
peaceful expression of political views. For example, on June 4, 1991 a
technician from a foreign joint venture company in Guangzhou wrote
out a banner commemorating the anniversary of the Tiananmen incident,
which said: "The martyrs to democracy are not forgotten-the demo-
cratic movement will live forever." The man was immediately arrested
when he placed the banner in front of a statue of Sun Yatsen.73
Here, as with most provisions, the proposed code asks U.S. compa-
nies to promote internationally recognized human rights that have a sig-
nificant nexus with their own business operations and interests. The
Chinese concept of "state secrets" has often been abused to punish citi-
zens for revealing publicly available information to foreigners.74 In the
aftermath of the June 1989 crackdown, there were repeated reports of
Chinese employees of joint ventures being harassed or disciplined by au-
thorities for doing exactly what their jobs required of them-providing
necessary economic, legal and business information to their foreign coun-
terparts to enable the proper functioning of the venture. The Chinese
law on state secrets has been revised to establish much clearer definitions
of what constitute "state secrets" than previously existed, and to require
that documents legally required to be classified be appropriately marked
with the relevant degree of secrecy.7" This law provides a basis in Chi-
nese law for foreign businesspersons to resist interference with legitimate
open communication.
(7) Pursuant to Section 941(b)(8), U.S. Economic Cooperation Projects
in China Should
DISCOURAGE COMPULSORY POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION ON THE PREM-
ISES OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC COOPERA-
TION PROJECT.
73 See ANTHEMS OF DEFEAT, supra note 55, at 71.
74 One of two charges against a Chinese staff member of Shell International Petroleum, leading
to six and a half years in solitary confinement during the cultural revolution, was that she wrote a
foreigner about the size of Shanghai's grain supply for a given year. She was also accused of defend-
ing a "traitor" and opposing a Central Committee resolution. NIEN CHENG, LIFE AND DEATH IN
SHANGHAI 353 (1986). Recently, a young Chinese man, Bai Weiji, and his wife, Zhao Lei, were
sentenced to 10 and six years in prison respectively for providing reports about the economy, analy-
ses of recent foreign policy issues and speeches by Chinese leaders to a reporter for The Washington
Post. Lena H. Sun, Casualties of A Paper War In China: Every Day, Citizens Are Arrested; This
Time, They Were My Friends, WASH. POST, July 25, 1993, at Cl; Nicholas D. Kristof, Chinese Gets
10 Years for Giving Data to Foreigner, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1993, at A6.
75 See Timothy A. Gelatt, The New Chinese State Secrets Law, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 255
(1989).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 14:66 (1993)
This provision seeks to assure that U.S. businesses operating in
China do not themselves become complicit in practices that infringe on
the internationally-recognized right to freedom of thought and political
opinion.76 Despite the strong nexus between the conduct addressed and
the companies affected by this principle, the U.S. business community
has voiced particular objection to this provision, arguing that it would
require violation of Chinese law.
This objection is unfounded. The relevant law is a 1987 set of "Pro-
visional Regulations on the Provision of Political Ideological Activities
for Chinese Employees of Sino-Foreign Joint Equity and Sino-Foreign
Cooperative Enterprises," promulgated jointly by the State Economic
Commission, the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, the
Organization Department of the Central Committee, the All-China Fed-
eration of Trade Unions and the Communist Youth League." Although
these regulations clearly contemplate education in basic Party principles
and state ideology for employees of Sino-foreign joint business ventures,
they in no way require such education. Most significant in this regard,
the regulations in Article 5 provide that joint ventures shall "adopt flexi-
ble and varied methods and forms of ideological education for its Chinese
employees... Mass educational activities shall be conducted after work
hours. If it is necessary for these activities to occupy work time, the
approval of the administrative leaders of the enterprise shall first be ob-
tained."78 Specific regulations on Chinese trade unions, which are gener-
ally responsible for political education activity in both Chinese and
foreign-invested enterprises, similarly provide that trade union activity
shall in general be conducted outside of working time unless otherwise
approved by enterprise management.79 Although the Chinese legislation
cited refers to the time, rather than the place, of political study activity, it
is the premise of Chinese legal provisions on trade unions in joint ven-
tures (which, as noted, are the primary vehicles for political education)
that such unions will have their own premises in which to conduct their
activities.8" While these Chinese provisions may not be directed at
human rights concerns, they do take account of foreign businesses' objec-
tion to the idea of political study infringing on the proper functioning of
76 See, e.g., ICCPR, arts. 18 and 19, supra note 48, at 55; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, arts. 18 and 19, supra note 48, at 74.
77 Promulgated Aug. 11, 1987 reprinted in BUSINEss LAws OF THE PRC (CCH), at 15, 631.
78 Id. at 15, 635.
79 Trade Union Law, supra note 66, at 8.
80 Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese.
Foreign Joint Ventures, issued by the State Council, Sept. 20, 1983, art. 99; Trade Union Law, supra
note 66, art. 38.
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an enterprise. U.S. businesses should capitalize on this pragmatic con-
cern, as reflected in relevant Chinese legislation, to achieve enhanced
human rights protection for their Chinese staff as well as greater
productivity.
Since, as noted, Chinese regulations provide for the possibility of
political study during working time upon the approval of management,
U.S. companies whose American management staff play a leading role
and who enjoy a majority interest in a Sino-American joint venture, as
well as companies with wholly-owned ventures, should be held to partic-
ularly high standards in implementing Principle 8.
(8) The Final Principle Seeks to Assure that U.S. Economic
Cooperation Projects
ATrEMPT TO RAISE WITH THE RELEVANT AGENCIES OF THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT THOSE INDIVIDUALS DETAINED, ARRESTED, OR CON-
VICTED SINCE MARCH 1989 SOLELY FOR NONVIOLENT EXPRESSION OF
THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS, AND TO URGE THE OFFICIALS CONCERNED TO
RELEASE PUBLICLY A LIST OF THE NAMES OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS.
This provision is a particularly constructive attempt to harness the
influence of the U.S. presence in China to promote human rights there.
We believe that companies should, whenever possible, attempt to imple-
ment this principle by working for the release of political prisoners in
areas of China where they have significant operations.
Like the Sullivan Principles, which required adhering corporations
to support the elimination of South African apartheid laws, this principle
urges corporations operating in China to play a proactive role in address-
ing one of the most serious blights on China's human rights record.
Hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals are currently detained in
China because of their peaceful expression of views. As with other provi-
sions of the code, this principle does not require companies to apply stan-
dards that are outside the bounds of Chinese law or stated policy, which
asserts that citizens enjoy the freedom to express views peacefully.81
II. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
As the discussion in Part I makes clear, the most important U.S.
efforts to promote human rights in China have substantial implications
for U.S. companies that export and invest there. In consequence, the
business community simultaneously has emerged as a central voice in the
81 For further discussion of business efforts in this regard, see part II, infra. For analysis of the
procedural provisions of the code-of-conduct legislation, see GETrING DOWN TO BUSINEss, supra
note 1.
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domestic debate about U.S. human rights policy toward China, and has
become the focus of debate about its own human rights responsibilities in
the PRC. Though triggered by the unique confluence of U.S. policy in-
terests in the PRC, the latter debate has implications reaching far beyond
China, and indeed has inspired a broader reexamination of the human
rights responsibilities of corporations that operate across borders.3 2
Notably, some of the most developed thinking in this regard has
taken place in the boardrooms of corporations. As elaborated below, a
growing number of transnational companies have in recent years adopted
human rights policies governing their overseas investment practices, and
the trend has been toward adoption of increasingly stringent policies.
Spurred in part by public criticism of corporations whose overseas invest-
ments appear to support repressive practices, these policies have, with
some exceptions, emerged without substantial guidance from either the
professional human rights community or the U.S. government about ap-
propriate standards for corporate investment in highly repressive coun-
tries. And so, as one corporation after another seeks to meet its human
rights responsibilities, there is a pressing need for clarity about what, pre-
cisely, those responsibilities are.
In addressing this issue, we begin by examining the sometimes con-
flicting values that have shaped recent debate about corporations' human
rights responsibilities. Building on that analysis, we consider broader is-
sues raised by efforts to promote human rights by regulating U.S. corpo-
rations' conduct overseas. Specifically, we address the question whether
it is appropriate for a national government to promote values embedded
in public international law by regulating private actors' conduct in an-
other country.
A. Do Businesses Have Human Rights Responsibilities?
In considering the policy concerns that drive current debate about
corporations' human rights responsibilities, it is useful first to make clear
what is not at issue. Business leaders now rarely press the claim, once
commonplace, that social policy and corporate practice occupy distinct
spheres-and that a rigid separation should be preserved.83 Perhaps
82 See Frank Gibney Jr., Questions About China: U.S. Companies Are Caught in a Debate Over
Beiing's Human-Rights Record, NEWSWEEX (int'l ed.), May 17, 1993, at 40.
83 For a classic statement of the view that businesses should not be concerned with "social re-
sponsibility," see Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 1970 (Magazine), at 32. This claim has long been discredited, at least in its
most sweeping form, in part because it is hopelessly circular. Our beliefs about what are proper
concerns of the business community are themselves social constructs, and have evolved significantly
over time in tandem with broader changes in the social and political environment. Further, to the
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more to the point, at a time when consumers are increasingly assertive in
demanding that the products they purchase be produced in a manner
they deem "socially responsible," it is scarcely possible to draw a bright
line between corporations' goal of maximizing profits and social expecta-
tions that they behave responsibly. Increasingly, public attention to such
issues as the use of prison labor in products exported to the United States
is making human rights a "bottom line" concern for multinational
companies. 
4
Further, no company can afford to disregard the impact of massive
human rights violations on the investment climate in a country where it
may operate. The rule of law-the bedrock of human rights protec-
tion-is also essential to a stable and predictable environment for invest-
ment. One need only consider the devastating effect on the economies of
the Latin American countries ruled by military dictatorships throughout
the 1970s and, in many cases, into the 1980s to appreciate the correlation
between massive human rights violations and investment risk. 5
In part for these reasons, it is increasingly rare to hear business rep-
resentatives claim that human rights issues are of no legitimate concern
to corporations. 86 Still, the generalization that transnational investors
may profit from a host country's respect for human rights-as well as
their own adherence to human rights principles-is of scant value in ad-
dressing the question whether corporations have responsibilities in re-
spect of human rights. In particular, the truism that corporate interests
extent that this argument asserts that it is the role of government to fashion and implement policy-
in this case human rights policy-it also necessarily concedes to government the right to further
specific policies by, inter alia, regulating the practices of U.S. corporations. Examples of such regu-
lation, from legislation restricting companies' ability to discriminate or pollute at home, to laws
prohibiting corrupt practices by corporations abroad, are too numerous to leave any room for doubt-
ing the legitimacy of government efforts to advance social policies in part by regulating corporate
behavior.
84 See McCormick & Levinson, supra note 4, at 48.
85 There are, to be sure, some apparent counter-examples of countries with strong economies
despite serious violations of human rights-in Latin America, Chile under Pinochet stands out as a
notable example. But those who might suggest that these economies are strong because the govern-
ment denied citizens' fundamental rights pose a false dichotomy. One can hardly imagine that Au-
gusto Pinochet's economic policies, to the extent they were successful, would have been less so had
his government not "disappeared" and killed over 2,000 people. (Indeed, if it were necessary to
prove that one needn't choose between economic growth and respect for human rights, Chile's econ-
omy has thrived under the democratic government of Patricio Aylwin, which succeeded the 17-year
dictatorship of General Pinochet.)
86 But see Matthew Lippman, Transnational Corporations and Repressive Regimes The Ethical
Dilemma, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 542, 549-50 (1985) (noting that executives of multinational compa-
nies "typically respond to criticism of their relationship with repressive regimes by pointing out that
corporations are economic rather than political entities and that as such they should not be held
responsible for the policies pursued by their host countries ... ").
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are in some respects well served by adherence to human rights standards
provides no guidance in identifying corporations' responsibilities in situa-
tions where there is an apparent or genuine conflict between their busi-
ness interests and human rights values.
Is there, for example, any principled reason to fault corporations for
taking advantage of cheap labor in a developing country? Does the an-
swer to this question depend on whether labor conditions fall below a
minimum standard of acceptability? Do transnational investors in a na-
tion like China bear some measure of responsibility for the country's
human rights problems on the ground that their investments help sustain
a highly repressive government? On the other hand, in today's economy,
can U.S. companies afford not to invest in the world's largest and fastest-
growing market? Does their investment indeed serve human rights
goals-as many companies claim-as well as their economic interests?
These questions begin to frame the issues that are the pith of current
debate about the appropriate role of businesses in responding to human
rights violations in countries where they have substantial investments.
No country has done more to sharpen that debate than China. It is the
proverbial test case: how we define foreign investors' human rights re-
sponsibilities in China will serve as a critical precedent elsewhere. The
current parameters of debate over corporations' human rights role in
China are thus well worth examining.
As indicated in part I.B.4, that debate has revolved, above all,
around the annual determination of China's MFN trade status. Though
views within the business community have varied, the overwhelming ma-
jority of U.S. companies with substantial business activity in China have
opposed efforts to attach human rights conditions to renewal of China's
MFN status. While their principal concern has been the impact of such
conditions on their exports and investments,8 7 corporate spokespersons
have repeatedly invoked the rhetoric of human rights in support of their
position. In particular, business representatives have opposed proposals
to attach human rights conditions to renewal of China's MFN status on
the ground that the very presence of U.S. companies in China has a liber-
alizing effect and that this presence should not be imperiled.
This assertion encompasses several distinct claims. In the context of
China, business leaders have frequently asserted that the web of contacts
between Chinese citizens and U.S. investors that develops in the course
of business relationships promotes the transfer of liberal democratic val-
ues from this side of the Pacific to the East. 8 Further, advocates of
87 See supra part I.B.4.c.
88 See, eg., UNITED STATES-CHINA BUSINESS COUNCIL, CHINA POLICY: FOSTERING US COM-
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"constructive engagement" also claim that transnational investment in
repressive nations promotes greater integration of the host country in the
international community, thereby enlarging its exposure to the shared
values of civilized nations.8 9 It is sometimes further asserted that liberal
political values are an inevitable concomitant of a liberal market econ-
omy, and that transnational efforts to foster development of such an
economy in China through expanded trade and investment practices will
therefore promote political liberalization as well. 90
A third and related claim is that U.S. investment in developing
countries promotes economic growth, thereby fostering development of a
middle class. Since, the argument continues, it is when this happens that
citizens begin to assert demands for fundamental liberties, business in-
vestment spurs longer-term progress in respect of human rights. In the
shorter term, foreign investment creates opportunities for employment
that enhance the economic and social rights of the direct beneficiaries. 91
These are compelling arguments, and cannot be readily dismissed.
But are the claims justified?
It depends. Whether a substantial U.S. business presence contrib-
utes to improved human rights conditions or helps bolster a repressive
regime depends on the particular circumstances of each country, the con-
ditions under which businesses operate, and the behavior of the busi-
nesses themselves. When, for example, the manager of a joint venture
operation discharges a Chinese employee because of government pressure
based on the individual's support for democracy, that manager becomes
an agent for the Chinese government's denial of internationally-recog-
nized human rights. When, instead, a potential investor insists as a pre-
condition of investing on assurances that its employees' right to freedom
of association will be fully protected, that investor's presence may in fact
help foster improved human rights conditions. But here, too, an inves-
PETITIVENESS AND THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP; Testimony on U.S.-China Trade Relations,
Statement of the Emergency Committee for American Trade on United States-China Trade Rela-
tions to Subcommittee on Trade of the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives,
June 8, 1993; Richard W. Younts, Senior Vice President and Corporate Executive Director Interna-
tional-Asia and Americas, Motorola, Before the Subcommittee on Trade, Ways and Means Commit-
tee of the House of Representatives, June 8, 1993 [hereinafter Motorola Testimony]; see also,
generally, Barber B. Conable, Jr. & David M. Lampton, China, The Coming Power, FOREIGN AFF.,
Winter 1992/93, at 145, 146;.
89 See Lippman, supra note 86, at 550.
90 Motorola Testimony, supra note 88; THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES &
NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS, UNITED STATES AND CHINA RE-
LATIONS AT A CROSSROADS, 20-28 (1993); see also, generally, Conable & Lampton, supra note 88, at
146.
91 See Lippman, supra note 86, at 550.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 14:66 (1993)
tor's ability to promote human rights may vary widely depending on
both the conditions in a host country and on the nature of its investment.
A company with direct investments in a country may, for example, have
greater scope to promote human rights than a corporation that merely
utilizes contractors there.
The larger claim that investment in a country like China helps foster
human rights improvements as a byproduct of its increased contact with
individuals who subscribe to liberal values seems incapable of standing
on its own as a justification for investment, if only because there can be
no dispositive way of testing this claim. While some argue, for example,
that areas of China with large levels of foreign investment, such as the
southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, boast relatively good
human rights records, there is significant evidence to the contrary. Re-
cent reports indicate that in Guangdong, where both domestic economic
reform and foreign business and investment activity outpace such re-
forms and activities in every other part of China, arbitrary arrests and
violations of minimal due process rights have contributed to a prison
population larger than that of any other province in China.9 2
The claim that enhanced employment opportunities made possible
by foreign investment in and of themselves advance human rights is ini-
tially appealing, but proves problematic upon closer scrutiny. To the ex-
tent that the transnationalization of investment has engendered a global
chase for the cheapest labor markets, international investment practices
inevitably drive down wage levels as developing countries compete for
foreign investment.93 In this setting, it has become increasingly difficult
to persuade governments of developing countries to respect internation-
ally-recognized labor rights, particularly the right to receive a wage that
meets the "basic human needs" of workers.9"
In the longer term, this phenomenon has in many developing coun-
tries apparently retarded further expansion of the middle class, and in-
stead has widened the economic gap between laborers and the
management class.95 Against this background, it is increasingly difficult
to assume that investment in and of itself will promote expansion of a
92 Carl Goldstein, Two Faces of Reform: Guangdong's Economy Booms, But the Crime Rate
Soars, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 8, 1993, at 15.
93 This point was developed by John J. Keller, a business executive, at a workshop on business
investment and human rights in Asia convened by the Washington College of Law of The American
University and Asia Watch in Washington, D.C. on February 26, 1993. Cf. Note, Forum Non Con-
veniens and Multinational Corporations: A Government Interest Approach, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 699, 712-13 (1986) (discussing "industrial flight" phenomenon associated with heavily
regulated industries).
94 See discussion infra part III.A.
95 Again, the authors owe this point to John J. Keller. See note 93, supra. Our analysis assumes
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middle class, thereby enlarging the number of citizens who enjoy eco-
nomic and social rights and simultaneously making it more likely that
citizens will insist upon personal and political freedoms. In this respect
too, then, whether foreign investment promotes human rights depends-
in this instance, on whether the foreign investor assures adequate condi-
tions of work, including fair wages.
While the impact of foreign investment on human rights thus cannot
be captured by superficial generalizations, it is equally clear that transna-
tional business practice can, and often does, have a direct and substantial
impact on human rights conditions in a host country. The previously-
noted example of an investor in China who is pressured to discharge an
employee because of her political beliefs exemplifies the point, and other
examples are seemingly infinite. It is precisely because (and when) in-
vestment practices have significant human rights consequences that it is
appropriate to hold corporations responsible for those consequences. To
the extent that their investment practices directly affect human rights
conditions, transnational corporations have a corresponding responsibil-
ity to assure, at a minimum, that their operations do not contribute, how-
ever inadvertently, to violations. As we elaborate elsewhere, the
determination whether a company's investment practices contribute to
human rights should, in highly repressive countries, include an analysis
of whether the investment in and of itself makes a company complicit in
pervasive violations. In Myanmar (Burma), for example, it is virtually
impossible for foreign investors to enter a joint venture arrangement
without having as a direct or indirect business partner the notoriously
repressive military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council,
and this should weigh heavily in prospective investors' decisions. More
generally, substantial foreign investment may help stabilize a repressive
regime that would otherwise be more responsive to human rights
pressure.
As stated at the outset, we also believe that U.S. and other major
investors in China should affirmatively promote human rights improve-
ments there because they possess unique influence with the Chinese gov-
ernment. When U.S. corporations or individual business executives have
undertaken affirmative measures along these lines, their impact has been
substantial. Their accomplishments, examined below, make clear that
private investors could have a singular impact on the state of human
rights in China if they undertook to make human rights considerations a
key component of their business strategies. The fact that the Chinese
that the local employment opportunities created by foreign investment in underdeveloped countries
tend to consist overwhelmingly of non-value-added jobs.
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government publicly hails soaring levels of foreign investment for propa-
ganda effect makes it all the more vital that foreign investors make clear
where they stand on human rights.
B. Regulating Private Actors to Enforce Public International Law
Implicit in the foregoing analysis are several important assumptions:
1) There is now a set of "human rights" that can be readily identified and
objectively defined; 2) It is appropriate to expect transnational corpora-
tions to curb otherwise permissible investment practices when they im-
peril basic rights; and 3) In the absence of adequate self-regulation by
corporations, national governments may appropriately regulate corpo-
rate behavior to further human rights goals, even with respect to overseas
conduct. All three of these assumptions are implicitly challenged by the
charge, which has at times been put forth by representatives of the busi-
ness community (as well as others), that efforts to link investment prac-
tices to human rights conditions is a form of cultural imperialism-a
misguided effort to impose American values on other nations.
The answer to this claim is simple. Human rights are not exclu-
sively American values; they are universal. International law imposes
obligations on all states to respect certain universal rights.96 As elabo-
rated in Part III, those rights include a core set of rights relating to labor
conditions, as well as more generally-applicable assurances of personal
autonomy. These rights are defined in positive international law, and
have long been the subject of international enforcement efforts.
9 7
Although relevant international instruments typically establish du-
ties on the part of states to respect individuals' rights, they also have
significant implications for the behavior of non-governmental actors, in-
cluding corporations. The key international human rights conventions
typically require States Parties not only to respect the rights enumerated
in the treaties, but also to "ensure" or "secure" those rights.9 8 That duty
96 See generally Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 980-
1001 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW]. The universality of human rights was re-
cently reaffirmed at the U.N.-sponsored World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna, Aus-
tria in June 1993. See Final Document of the World Conference on Human Rights, para. 3 (1993).
97 Internationally-recognized human rights standards have been incorporated into a broad array
of federal laws governing U.S. foreign policy. See Diane F. Orentlicher, The Power of an Idea: The
Impact of United States Human Rights Policy, I TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 43, 48-49
(1991). Some state and city governments in the United States also have adopted policies designed to
promote human rights in particular foreign countries. See Michael H. Shuman, Two Wrongs Don't
Make Human Rights, BULL. MUNICIPAL FOREIGN POL'Y (Winter 1989-90), at 4.
98 See, eg., ICCPR, art. 2(1), supra note 48, at 53; European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (signed on Nov. 4, 1950; en-
tered into force Sept. 3, 1953); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 1(1), adopted Jan. 7,
Corporations and Human Rights
14:66 (1993)
has authoritatively been interpreted to require States Parties to assert ef-
fective control over non-state actors to ensure that their conduct does not
infringe individual rights recognized in the conventions.99
Still, complex issues are raised by the question of which government
should regulate transnational companies to assure that they do not in-
fringe human rights. It seems fairly straightforward that a national gov-
ernment, such as the PRC government, can and should act to ensure that
non-state as well as state actors operating within its sovereign borders do
not infringe internationally-protected human rights. By placing primary
responsibility for assuring protection of human rights on the government
that has control of the relevant territory, international law seeks to as-
sure adequate protection while respecting national sovereignty. The
problem, of course, is that governments like that of the PRC are often
themselves chief violators of human rights. Far from assuring that non-
state actors within their borders respect human rights, the Chinese gov-
ernment brings pressure to bear on business and other enterprises to
carry out government policies that infringe protected rights.10° In this
setting, leaving regulation of corporate activities that affect human rights
to the host government would effectively preclude adequate protection of
those rights.
Further, even a government that is more inclined than that of the
PRC to protect the human rights of its citizens may be hard-pressed to
enact adequate legal protections against potentially harmful conduct of
foreign investors. Intense competition among developing countries for
foreign investment, combined with multinational corporations' search for
countries that offer them the lowest costs-typically correlated with a
comparatively low level of regulation-operate as powerful disincentives
for underdeveloped countries to impose stringent requirements on for-
eign investors. ' 1 A compelling case can thus be made for holding na-
tional governments accountable for ensuring that the overseas conduct of
1970, O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/ser.K./XVI/1.1, doc. 65 rev. 1, corr. 1 (1970), reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 673 (1970).
99 See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2568-80 (1991). Further, the ICCPR, supra note
48, makes clear that non-state actors may not interfere with rights recognized under the Covenant.
Article 5(1) provides:
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the
rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided
for in the present Covenant.
100 See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
101 See Lippman, supra note 86, at 545; Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note, One-Way Ticket Home:
The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff [hereinafter One- Way
Ticket], 77 CORNELL L. REV. 650, 674-75 (1992).
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their companies conforms with international human rights standards 02
or for developing an appropriate international regulatory regime.10 3
Policy considerations aside, it is clear that the United States has the
power to regulate the overseas conduct of U.S. companies to assure their
compliance with international human rights legal standards. Under the
"nationality principle" of jurisdiction, the United States may regulate the
overseas conduct of its nationals, including corporations. 104 Congress
has in fact enacted numerous laws regulating the overseas conduct of
U.S. corporations, governing such matters as their compliance with the
Arab boycott of Israel and corrupt practices abroad. 105 There are, to be
sure, limits on the extent to which the United States may regulate the
overseas conduct of U.S. companies, particularly when a regulation
would conflict with the law of the host state. In that situation, the host
state's law generally should prevail. 0 6 (As noted elsewhere, none of the
China-specific proposals advanced in this article would require U.S. com-
panies to undertake action that conflicts with Chinese law. 107) Further,
while both U.S. and international law generally forbid otherwise permis-
sible assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction if they would be "unreason-
able,"10 8 the reasonableness of such regulations is determined by, inter
alia, "the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system," according to the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States." U.S. regulation of Ameri-
can companies' overseas conduct that aims to assure compliance with
international human rights law would fall squarely within this measure
of reasonableness. Indeed, the peremptory status of a core set of interna-
tionally-recognized human rights1 would justify the United States in
forbidding American companies from engaging in conduct abroad that
102 For discussion of a national government's self-interest in regulating its companies' overseas
operations, see One-Way Ticket, supra note 101, at 675.
103 One effort to establish international standards governing transnational corporations is the
Draft U.N. Code of Conduct On Transnational Corporations. See Report on the Special Session of
the Commission on Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 7), U.N. Doe E/1983/
Rev. 1 (Annex 11) at 12-27, reprinted in 23 I.L.M 626 (1984).
104 See Steele et a]. v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313
U.S. 69, 73 (1941); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 402(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The U.S. government has somewhat greater
scope to regulate the conduct of foreign branches of companies incorporated in the United States
than that of subsidiaries of U.S. companies that are organized under the laws of a foreign state. See
id. § 414.
105 See INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 96, at 839.
106 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 104, §§ 441, 414 cmt. d.
107 See supra part I.B.5; see also discussion infra part III.E.
108 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 104, § 403 cmt. a.
109 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 104, § 403(2)(e).
110 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 104, § 702 cmt. n.
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breaches those rights, even if its prohibition conflicted with a host coun-
try's law. 1 '
This form of extraterritorial regulation would be much in keeping
with broader developments in transnational law. Municipal law that reg-
ulates transnational activities between non-state actors, as well as be-
tween such actors and state governments, occupies a growing area of
transnational law.112 While "formally regulat[ing] individual merchants
outside national legal systems," that law "is ultimately dependent on
them." 3 An important subset of this law regulates private actors to
promote public policy values, and in this sense stands at the intersection
of private and public international law. The emergence of this form of
regulation is an inevitable concomitant of, and appropriate response to,
the growing influence of non-state actors in countries other than their
national state.1 4 Such regulation may appropriately seek to shape state
action in the host country by fostering "transnational patterns of inter-
est"' 15 that are likely to have this effect.
To say that it is appropriate for a government, such as the U.S. gov-
ernment, to regulate the overseas conduct of companies that bear its na-
tionality does not necessarily mean that such regulation is the most
desirable means of assuring conformity with international human rights
standards by transnational companies. As with other aspects of corpo-
rate practice that have a significant impact on social policy, government
regulation is necessary only when companies fail adequately to police
their own behavior. Further, as we suggest in Part I.B.4.b-c, the govern-
ment can effectively play a proactive role in encouraging the private sec-
tor to police itself.
In the section that follows, we examine the accomplishments of sev-
eral corporations and individual business executives who have provided
leadership in defining and implementing transnational corporations'
human rights responsibilities. Building on their efforts, we then set forth
general recommendations for businesses investing or considering invest-
ing in China and other countries scourged by pervasive human rights
violations.
111 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 104, § 403 cmt. e.
112 See Anne-Marie S. Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual
Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 230 (1993).
113 Id. at 232.
114 Cf Susan Strange, The Name of the Game, in SEA-CHANGES: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
IN A WORLD TRANSFORMED 238 (Nicholas X. Rizopoulos ed., 1990) (discussing the erosion of
national authority caused by the expansion of an "international business civilization").
115 Burley, supra note 112, at 232.
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C. Business Initiatives to Promote Human Rights in China and
Elsewhere
In the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, a number of business
executives and transnational corporations have sought to promote
human rights in China. Perhaps the best-known individual initiative is
the effort by U.S. businessman John Kamm to secure the release of per-
sons detained for the non-violent expression of political opinion. Kamm,
a long-time resident of Hong Kong, was general manager of Occidental
Chemical Corporation Far East and was responsible for that company's
considerable China operations when he began to address human rights
violations in the PRC. At the time of the Tiananmen incident, Kamm
was the chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong
Kong, and in that capacity became an outspoken opponent of congres-
sional efforts to attach human rights conditions to renewal of China's
most favored nation (MFN) trade status. In testimony before Congress
and in other fora, Kamm argued that the U.S. government should not
adopt measures that could effectively sever China's trade relationship
with the United States because, Kamm asserted, that relationship itself is
an effective vehicle for liberalization. Believing that he had to gain
human rights concessions from the PRC to avert congressional efforts to
attach human rights conditions to renewal of China's MFN status,
Kamm began to negotiate with Chinese authorities for the release of
political prisoners in the course of his business visits to the PRC.
Kamm appears in fact to have been instrumental in securing the
release of some political prisoners. ' 16 Kamm, who left Occidental and
now combines business consulting with human rights work in China, has
stated that neither the business activities of Occidental nor his private
consulting business have been adversely affected by his human rights in-
terventions.117 In Kamm's view, he has been effective in his human
rights efforts precisely because of his longstanding business relationship
with the PRC.
At the level of corporate initiative, a growing roster of U.S.-based
companies have adopted policies designed to address human rights con-
116 For example, The New York Times reported that the Chinese government announced on May
22, 1992 that it had released three elderly Roman Catholic clerics from detention, and noted that
John Kamm had been lobbying for their release. Sheryl WuDunn, China Releases 3 Catholic Priests
Who Spent Decades in Detention, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1992, at A3. See also Gibney, supra note 82,
at 41 (estimating that Kamm's efforts "have contributed to the release of more than 100 students,
priests and businessmen from Chinese jails.").
117 James McGregor, Many U.S. Firms in China Keep Quiet About Success, ASIAN WALL ST. J.
WEEKLY, Nov. 11, 1991, at 16; Lena Sun, The Business of Human Rights, WASH. POsT, Feb. 25,
1992, at Dl.
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cerns relating to investment in China and, in some instances, more glob-
ally. For example on March 31, 1992 Sears, Roebuck and Co.
announced that it had adopted a formal policy to assure that its imports
from the PRC do not include products made by prison labor. The policy
requires that all contracts that Sears signs for the import of products
emanating from China include a clause stating that none of the goods
subject to the contract have been manufactured by "convict or forced
labor."11
The policy also asserts that "Sears employees may from time to time
conduct unannounced inspections of manufacturing sites in mainland
China to determine compliance with U.S. law as regards the use of forced
or convict labor." Further, the policy requires Sears to maintain lists of
its Chinese suppliers' production sites and to attempt to compile a list of
the addresses of sites of forced labor in the PRC, so that the two lists can
be compared.
The Sears policy was adopted in the wake of an announcement by
Levi Strauss & Co. that it would apply human rights and related criteria
in its selection of business partners. Formally adopted in January 1992,
that policy has had a significant impact on Levi Strauss & Co.'s invest-
ment decisions vis-a-vis China.
The policy, which addresses "Business Partner Terms of Engage-
ment and Guidelines for Country Selection," includes several human
rights guidelines as well as guidelines on such matters as the environ-
ment. The five-point "Guidelines for Country Selection" include a provi-
sion asserting that Levi Strauss & Co. "should not initiate or renew
contractual relationships in countries where there are pervasive viola-
tions of basic human rights." '19 Applying this provision, in late April
1993 Levi Strauss & Co. decided to begin a phased withdrawal from its
operations in China, which involve sewing or finishing goods, a process
that will continue to completion unless there is a substantial improve-
ment in human rights conditions in the PRC. At the same time, the
company decided that it would not initiate direct investment in China.
120
118 The reference to "convict or forced labor" is particularly important in light of revelations
about the extent of forced labor practices in the PRC. According to Asia Watch, not only are
prisoners serving court sentences required to work without compensation to produce goods from
which the state profits, but so too are criminal suspects, including those in political cases, during
lengthy periods of pre-trial detention. See ANTHEMS OF DEFEAT, supra note 55, at 104-11.
119 The human rights provisions of Levi Strauss & Co.'s "Business Partner Terms of Engage-
ment" are set forth in Appendix A.
120 Levi Strauss & Co. has terminated its relationship with at least 30 suppliers and extracted
reforms from more than 120 others. See McCormick & Levinson, supra note 4, at 49. The company
has also pulled out of Myanmar (Burma), closed down operations in Bangladesh and temporarily
suspended operations in Peru pursuant to its policy. See Gibney, supra note 82, at 40.
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Reebok International Ltd. adopted a human rights policy that re-
sponded to specific concerns raised by the human rights situation in
China, and subsequently adopted a more comprehensive set of human
rights principles governing workplace conditions in all of its overseas op-
erations, including those in China. 21 The first policy, adopted in No-
vember 1990, provided:
1. Reebok will not operate under martial law conditions or allow any mili-
tary presence on its premises.
2. Reebok encourages free association and assembly among its employees.
3. Reebok will seek to ensure that opportunities for advancement are
based on initiative, leadership and contributions to the business, not polit-
ical beliefs. Further, no one is to be dismissed from working at its factories
for political views or non-violent involvement.
4. Reebok will seek to prevent compulsory political indoctrination pro-
grams from taking place on its premises.
5. Reebok reafflirms that it deplores the use of force against human rights.
Like Reebok International Ltd. and Levi Strauss & Co., both Phil-
lips-Van Heusen and the Timberland Company have developed ethical
guidelines governing their relations with suppliers, contractors and busi-
ness partners.122 Timberland's policy further bans the company from
pursuing altogether business relations in a country "where basic human
rights are pervasively violated." Although Timberland's human rights
policy governs all of its overseas business relationships, the policy's de-
velopment was driven by the company's desire to address issues raised by
China in particular. In February 1993, Timberland decided to begin a
gradual termination of its sourcing from China, a process it plans to
complete by the end of 1993.
Variations among these three policies reflect each company's unique
corporate values. All, however, do incorporate internationally-recog-
nized human rights standards, and seek to assure that the companies'
investment practices conform to those standards.
III. UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES FOR TRANSNATIONAL
COMPANIES
As noted in Part II.B, international law provides objective standards
for determining the human rights responsibilities of transnational corpo-
rations. We now turn to that law for guidance in identifying universally-
121 Those standards, adopted in December 1992, are set forth in Appendix B.
122 The human rights provisions of Phillips-Van Heusen's policy are set forth in Appendix C.
Although Timberland has already begun to apply its policy, it has not, as of this writing, adopted its
policy in final form. The company is expected to have done so by the time this article is published;
copies of the policy will be available from the Office of Legal Counsel of the Timberland Company.
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relevant human rights principles for transnational corporations. Our
analysis in the next section focuses on an area of international law that is
particularly pertinent to conditions over which transnational investors
often have substantial control-workplace conditions in their overseas
operations and in the facilities of their business partners. As we have
noted elsewhere, however, the canvass of appropriate human rights con-
cerns of transnational corporations is considerably broader than the
workplace.
A. International Human Rights Law
International law has protected a core set of universally-recognized
human rights since World War II. Those rights, and states' duty to re-
spect them, are recognized in the Charter of the United Nations123 and
have been elaborated in numerous international instruments since 1948.
Although international law protecting human rights was "born in,
and out of the Second World War," it had several pre-war anteced-
ents, 24 including international law protecting various workers' rights.
While that law dates back at least to early 19th Century protections
against slavery, the foundation of most contemporary international stan-
dards protecting rights of workers is the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which
asserted that the signatories would "endeavor to secure and maintain fair
and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and children, both in
their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and
industrial nations extend.. ."125 The treaty also established the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation (ILO), a tripartite organization comprising
governments and representatives of employers and workers, which has
established and monitored compliance with a broad array of labor stan-
dards. The ILO has promulgated some 170 international conventions
elaborating labor standards, and members of the ILO are automatically
bound to respect the core principles of freedom of association.
1 26
Basic workers' rights have also been incorporated in various interna-
tional human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, which collectively are considered the international equivalent of
123 See, eg., U.N. CHARTER, supra note 48, at arts. 55-56.
124 Louis Henkin, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 5 (Louis Henkin ed. 1981).
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the U.S. Bill of Rights. Over the course of the past decade, moreover, the
United States has adopted a range of laws that incorporate these interna-
tional standards into U.S. trade policy.
For example, in 1983 Congress passed the Caribbean Basin Eco-
nomic Recovery Act,1 27 which establishes a system for designating cer-
tain Caribbean countries that are eligible for duty-free benefits in their
exports to the United States. The law directs the President, when deter-
mining a country's eligibility, to "take into account the degree to which
workers in such country are afforded reasonable workplace conditions
and enjoy the right to organize and bargain collectively. '"128
In 1984 Congress enacted a law129 that incorporated workers rights
criteria in the General System of Preferences (GSP) program initiated in
1974.130 That program authorizes the President to grant duty-free treat-
ment to eligible imports from certain developing countries. The GSP law
conditions duty-free treatment to otherwise eligible imports on whether
the exporting country whether a country "has taken or is taking steps to
afford to workers in that country (including any designated zone in that
country) internationally recognized worker rights." Drawing on ILO-
established standards, the GSP law defines "internationally recognized
worker rights" to include:
1) the right of association;
2) the right to organize and bargain collectively;
3) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor;
4) a minimum age for the employment of children; and
5) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of
work, and occupational safety and health.
As this and other legislation tying U.S. trade privileges to worker
rights suggest, international law establishes a core set of universally-pro-
tected labor rights, and those rights can be fully protected only through
international cooperation in enforcement. And as our previous analysis
suggests, a key component of an effective international strategy for pro-
tecting workers' rights is adherence by multinational corporations to
minimum standards. In the following section we propose a set of princi-
127 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384 (codified at 19
U.S.C. §§ 2071-2706 (1988)).
128 Subsequent legislation, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, made workers rights
criteria mandatory. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(8) (1988).
129 Title V of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, the Generalized System of Preferences Renewal
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 501, 98 Stat. 2948, 3018 (codified as note to 19 U.S.C. § 2461
(1988)).
130 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 501, 88 Stat. 1978, 2066 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2461 (1988)).
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pies that identify such minimum standards, drawing on relevant interna-
tional law.
B. Universal Human Rights Principles for Transnational
Corporations
Adherence to the following proposed principles would help assure
that the employment practices of overseas production facilities owned or
utilized by transnational companies comport with internationally-recog-
nized human rights, particularly workers' rights:
Proposed Principles for Transnational Companies
Corporations with direct investments in other countries shall uphold the
following principles in their overseas production facilities, and transna-
tional companies also shall select business partners, including contractors,
subcontractors and suppliers, who share their commitment to these
principles:
1. SAFE AND HEALTHY WORK ENVIRONMENT: The production facilities
owned or utilized by transnational companies shall assure employees a safe
and healthy workplace. Employees shall not be exposed to hazardous
conditions.
2. NON-DISCRIMINATION: The production facilities owned or utilized by
transnational companies shall not discriminate in hiring and employment
practices on such grounds as race, color, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, religion or other belief, or political or other opinion.
3. FAIR WAGES: The production facilities owned or utilized by transna-
tional companies shall pay wages that support the basic needs of workers
and their families. In no case shall they pay less than the minimum wage
required by local law.
4. WORKING HouRs AND OVERTIME: In general, the production facilities
owned or utilized by transnational companies should not require employees
to work more than 48 hours per week, except for voluntary and appropri-
ately compensated overtime, and should allow employees one day off each
week. Employees shall not work in excess of the maximum hours permitted
by local law.
5. CHILD LABOR: The production facilities owned or utilized by transna-
tional companies shall not use child labor. "Child" generally refers to per-
sons who are less than 14 years of age, or younger than the age for
completing compulsory education if that age is higher than 14. In countries
where the law defines "child" to include individuals who are older than 14,
business investors should apply that definition.
6. CONVICT OR FORCED LABOR: The production facilities owned or uti-
lized by transnational companies shall not permit the use of forced or com-
pulsory labor, or labor by persons who are detained or imprisoned, in the
manufacture of its products. Such companies should undertake affirmative
measures, such as on-site inspection of production facilities, to assure that
they do not manufacture or purchase materials that were produced by
forced or prison labor, and should terminate business relationships with any
sources found to utilize such labor.
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7. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: The production facilities owned or uti-
lized by transnational companies shall respect the right of employees to
establish and join organizations of their own choosing, without previous
authorization. Such companies should attempt to assure that no employee
is dismissed from a facility that produces their products or is otherwise
penalized because of his or her non-violent exercise of the right of
association.
8. TRADE UNION RIGHTS: The overseas production facilities owned or
utilized by transnational companies shall respect the right of all employees
to organize and bargain collectively.
9. MILITARY PRESENCE ON PREMISES OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES:
Companies that own or utilize overseas production facilities should oppose
any military effort to suppress internationally-protected labor activities of
the facilities' employees.
Each of these proposed principles is based upon well-established in-
ternational legal standards.
SAFE AND HEALTHY WORK ENVIRONMENT: The ILO has adopted
a number of recommendations and standards on specific health and
safety risks, some dating back to 1919. The broadest set of standards is
set forth in Convention No. 155 (Occupational Safety and Health and the
Working Environment, 1981), which aims at the establishment of a na-
tional policy on occupational safety, occupational health and the work
environment that would prevent work-related accidents and injury to
health by minimizing hazards in the working environment. 31 The con-
vention calls for an inspection system,132 provision by employers of pro-
tective clothing and equipment,13 and protection for workers who
remove themselves from work situations to avoid serious dangers to their
lives or health.134 The right to "[s]afe and healthy working conditions"
is also recognized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights."'5
NON-DISCRIMINATION: The right to non-discrimination is a bed-
rock principle of international human rights law. All of the guarantees
set forth in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, including those that pertain to employment, 136 are subject to a
general guarantee of non-discrimination.137 In addition, a number of
131 2 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Convention No. 155,
Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981, art. 4, at 1230-31, ILO (1992).
132 Id. art. 9, at 1232.
133 Id. art. 16(3), at 1234.
134 Id. art. 13, at 1233.
135 International Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, G.A. Res. 2200, art. 7, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (adopted Dec. 16, 1966 and
entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
136 Id. arts. 7-8.
137 Id. art. 2(2).
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ILO instruments recognize the right to non-discrimination in employ-
ment matters. For example a 1949 Recommendation concerning Labour
Clauses in Public Contracts provides: "It shall be an aim of policy to
abolish all discrimination among workers on grounds of race, colour, sex,
belief, tribal association or trade union affiliation in respect of" various
specified aspects of employment.
FAIR WAGES: Of the various ILO conventions relating to wages, the
most important one on minimum wages is the 1970 Convention concern-
ing Minimum Wage Fixing, with Special Reference to Developing Coun-
tries.138 Article 3 states that the elements that States Parties should take
into consideration in determining the level of minimum wages shall, so
far as possible and appropriate in relation to national practice and condi-
tions, include
(a) the needs of workers and their families, taking into account the general
level of wages in the country, the cost of living, social security benefits, and
relative standards of other social groups; and
(b) economic factors, including the requirements of economic develop-
ment, levels of productivity and the desirability of attaining and maintain-
ing a high level of employment. 
139
The ILO's Recommendation No. 135, also adopted in 1970, provides in
part that
3. In determining the level of minimum wages, account should be taken of
the following criteria, amongst others:
(a) the needs of workers and their families;
(b) the general level of wages in the country;
(c) the cost of living and changes therein;
(d) social security benefits;
(e) economic factors, including the requirements of economic development,
levels of productivity and the desirability of attaining and maintaining a
high level of employment. '4
WORKING HouRs: The first ILO convention, adopted in 1919, es-
tablished a general rule, subject to various specific exceptions, limiting
the hours of work in industry to eight per day and no more than forty-
138 ILO, Convention No. 131, Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970, supra note 131, at 949.
139 Id. art. 3, at 950; Article 23(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also recognizes
a right to fair wages: "Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensur-
ing for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary,
by other means of social protection." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 23(3), supra note
48, at 75. Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights also
recognizes, as part of the right to the "enjoyment ofjust and favourable conditions of work," remu-
neration that provides workers, "at a minimum," with "[flair wages" and "[a] decent living for
themselves and their families." ICESCR, art. 7, supra note 135, at 50.
140 ILO, Recommendation No. 135, Minimum Wage Fixing Recommendation, 1970, supra note
131, at 949.
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eight per week. 141 Convention No. 14, adopted in 1921, provides that
workers employed in industry should have at least twenty-four consecu-
tive hours of rest in every seven-day period. 42 (Like other general rules
established by ILO conventions, this one admits of some possible excep-
tions.) The right to reasonable working hours is also recognized in gen-
eral human rights instruments. For example Article 24 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights143 provides: "Everyone has the right to
rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and
periodic holidays with pay." Virtually every country's law recognizes a
forty-eight hour work week (not including overtime). 1"
CHILD LABOR: The ILO adopted several conventions designed to
protect child workers in the 1930s and 40s, but its most comprehensive
convention on youth employment, Convention No. 138, was adopted in
1973. That convention provides that the minimum age for employment
"shall not be less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling
and, in any case, shall not be less than 15 years."' 14 But the convention
goes on to say that an underdeveloped country may, after consulting
with the ILO, initially set the minimum age at 14.146 There are a few
other variations, such as a minimum age of 18 for dangerous work (or 16
under specified conditions); an exception allowing apprenticeship train-
ing for children at least 14 years old; and an exception for light work for
children between 13 and 15 (or at least 12 in countries where the mini-
mum age is 14). 147
CONVICT OR FORCED LABOR: ILO Convention No. 29, which was
adopted in 1930, aimed at the suppression of forced or compulsory labor
"within the shortest possible period."' 48 The convention defines "forced
or compulsory labour" as "all work or service which is exacted from any
141 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Convention No. 1,
Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919, at 1.
142 ILO, Convention No. 14, Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, 1921, art. 2(1), supra note 141,
at 45.
143 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 24, supra note 48, at 75.
144 Chinese law recognizes the concept of overtime, though it generally provides for more
favorable remuneration for overtime work for workers in foreign investment enterprises than for
those working in purely Chinese companies. China is party to at least 16 ILO conventions.
145 ILO, Convention No. 138, Minimum Age Convention, 1973, art. 2(3), supra note 131, at 1031.
146 ILO, Convention No. 138, Minimum Age Convention, 1973, art. 2(4), supra note 131, at 1031.
147 China is a party to ILO Convention No. 59, which fixes the minimum age for children in
industrial employment. That convention establishes a general minimum age of 15, subject to several
exceptions (such as a higher age for dangerous work; exceptions for work done in technical schools
and work in family businesses). ILO, Convention No. 59, Minimum Age (Industry) Convention
(Revised), 1937, supra note 141, at 240.
148 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Convention No. 29,
Forced Labour Convention, 1930, art. 1(1), at 115.
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person under the menace of penalty and for which the said person has
not offered himself voluntarily."' 149 The convention identifies circum-
stances that are not considered "forced or compulsory labour," including
"work or service exacted from any person as a consequence of a convic-
tion in a court of law, provided that the said work or service is carried
out under the supervision and control of a public authority and that the
said person is not hired to or placed at the disposal of private individuals,
companies or associations."' 150 Further, the convention specifically pro-
vides that the competent state authority "shall not... permit the imposi-
tion of forced or compulsory labour for the benefit of private individuals,
companies or associations." ' Any forced or compulsory labor for such
individuals/companies/associations is to be suppressed completely and
immediately.152 Although Convention No. 29 does not prohibit forced/
compulsory labor by convicted prisoners working under the supervision
of a public authority, a 1930 U.S. law, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act dis-
cussed in part I.B.2, prohibits the importation into the United States of
goods produced in whole or part by "convict labor" as well as "forced
labor or/and indentured labor under penal sanctions." '153 ILO Conven-
tion No. 105, adopted in 1957, sets forth an outright prohibition of
forced or compulsory labor in five specified circumstances.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND
BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY: These two principles are considered the bed-
rock of international workers' rights,154 and are protected by ILO Con-
ventions No. 87 (1948) and No. 98 (1949) respectively. The proposed
principle on the right of association tracks the pertinent language of ILO
Convention No. 87. These two rights are also recognized in the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights155; the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights156; and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. 157 The final recommended principle, assert-
149 Id. art. 2(1), at 115.
150 Id. art. 2(2)(c), at 116.
151 Id. art. 4(1), at 116.
152 Id. art. 4(2), at 116.
153 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1989).
154 See WORKER RIGHTS IN U.S. POLICY, supra note 125, at 4 ("The most fundamental of all
worker rights [are] the right to freedom of association... and the right to organize and bargain
collectively ... ").
155 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 20, supra note 48, at 75 (right of association); id.
art. 23 ("right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of [one's] interests").
156 ICCPR, art. 22(1), supra note 48, at 55 (right to "freedom of association with others, includ-
ing the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of [one's] interests").
157 ICESCR, art. 8, supra note 135, at 50 (right to form trade unions and join trade union of one's
choice; right of trade unions to function freely).
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ing opposition to military efforts to suppress labor activities, is a specific
assertion of these general principles.
Finally, the recommended provisions asserting support for workers'
rights to freedom of association and the right to form and join trade un-
ions would open the door to the possibility of companies intervening with
their contacts in a host government on behalf of employees who were,
e.g., detained and/or tortured because of their non-violent participation
in a study group, whether or not the violation occurred on the premises
of the companies' production facilities.
C. International Coordination
If the principles proposed in section B have a solid foundation in
international law, they still have scant support in international practice-
at least in the sense of universal compliance by multinational corpora-
tions with these standards. Indeed, as noted earlier the globalization of
labor markets has, at least in some areas, served to drive down wage
levels and to that extent has undermined international assurances of ade-
quate pay. Thus, any meaningful effort to promote adherence to global
principles along the lines suggested above would require coordination
among companies from major investing nations.
The most appropriate forum for such coordination may be the
Group of Seven Major Industrialized Democracies (G-7), whose mem-
bers include Japan, Canada and the major industrialized democracies of
Western Europe as well as the United States. The authors believe that
the United States government should take the lead in urging other G-7
countries to agree to promote corporate adherence to international
human rights standards along the lines outlined in section B-and, in-
deed, to utilize all appropriate multilateral fora to promote such coordi-
nated efforts. 158
In particular, it is critically important to bring Japan along in any
coordinated effort to apply human rights standards to investment in
China. Japan, with the United States, is among the PRC's top few trad-
ing and investment partners, and U.S. companies are often in tight com-
petition with their Japanese counterparts for the same contracts in the
PRC. Japan's adherence to a set of human rights principles is thus
clearly crucial. The United States should add this issue to the list of
trade issues it is currently discussing with Tokyo. In this regard, it is
relevant to note that in 1992 the Japanese government adopted new prin-
158 As previously noted, the code-of-conduct legislation sponsored by Senator Kennedy and Rep-
resentative Unsoeld, respectively, directs the U.S. Secretary of State to encourage OECD nations to
promote similar principles for companies that invest in China.
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ciples, which include a reference to human rights considerations, in its
overseas development aid program.15 9
D. To Invest or Not?
The proposals advanced in the preceding two sections seek to give
substance to the general principle that corporations must assure that
their own investment practices overseas do not contravene internation-
ally-recognized human rights. To the extent that the principles proposed
in section B assume that corporations have already undertaken overseas
investments, they beg the hard question whether there are situations in
which corporations should, on human rights grounds, avoid altogether
investing in a country.
Adherence to the principles proposed in section B would diminish
the significance of this issue by seeking to assure that foreign companies'
presence in a repressive country does not contribute to human rights vio-
lations and potentially contributes to improvement. Still, there may be
times when foreign investment in itself contributes to violations, if only
by bolstering a highly repressive regime that might otherwise be more
responsive to internal or external pressures to ameliorate violations.
Moreover potential investors may in some cases be able to exert consider-
able positive influence on a government if they make it known that their
investment determination will turn, in part, on human rights conditions.
Accordingly if, as we have suggested, transnational companies' business
decisions and practices should be guided by the principle that their con-
duct should not contribute to human rights violations and their influence
should be harnessed on behalf of human rights, it surely is appropriate
for companies to consider whether contemplated business decisions will
have an impact on human rights conditions.
The approach taken by Levi Strauss & Co. serves as a useful model
in this regard. As noted in part II.B., Levi Strauss & Co. has adopted a
policy pursuant to which it will not "initiate or renew contractual rela-
tionships in countries where there are pervasive violations of basic
human rights," and has determined that this standard is a bar to invest-
ment in both China and Myanmar (Burma)."6 At the same time, Levi
Strauss & Co.'s "Business Partner Terms of Engagement" help assure
that its operations in countries that have human rights problems-albeit
159 Jendrzejczyk, supra note 24. For discussion of Japanese companies' role in undermining in-
ternational sanctions imposed in the wake of the Tiananmen incident, see INT'L LEAGUE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, BUSINESS AS USUAL.. .?: THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN CHINA (1991).
160 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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not rising to the level of "pervasive violations of basic human rights"-
do not contribute to violations, and instead help raise the level of enjoy-
ment of basic rights in host countries. As noted in part II.B., Levi
Strauss & Co. has effectively applied the latter criteria to elicit meaning-
ful reforms in the employment practices of a number of business
partners. 161
Levi Strauss & Co.'s approach is based on the sound premise that a
company's leverage to promote human rights is maximized when it com-
bines a credible threat that it will terminate business relations either in a
country or with individual business partners with identifiable criteria for
non-termination, new investment, or contractual arrangements. Critical
to the success of such a policy is Levi Strauss & Co.'s determination to
identify specific conditions that must be satisfied-whether by a potential
business partner or a country-to qualify for investment or business
contracts.
Levi Strauss & Co.'s adoption of standards governing both engage-
ment with individual business partners and investment in countries is a
sophisticated approach to the vexing issue whether a company should
invest at all in a repressive country. The Levi Strauss & Co. policy
moves in a constructive fashion away from the "all or nothing" approach
that has long characterized public debate about transnational investors'
responsibilities vis-a-vis repressive governments. Total withdrawal from
business and investment is reserved under this approach for countries
where, in the company's estimation, "pervasive violations of basic human
rights" make it impossible for Levi Strauss & Co. to play a constructive
human rights role by investing there. The two-track approach embodied
in Levi Strauss & Co.'s policy clearly has the potential to maximize its
leverage to promote constructive change, while allowing the company
appropriate flexibility to respond appropriately and effectively to myriad
variations in relevant conditions.
E. Tailoring Corporate Initiatives to the Host Country Situation
While the proposals advanced in previous sections are universally
relevant, meaningful efforts to implement them will require that transna-
tional investors adopt policies that are responsive to the peculiar
problems of individual countries. 162 With this in mind, we offer the fol-
161 See supra note 120.
162 The approach taken by Levi Strauss & Co. in implementing its ethical code exemplifies this
recommendation. When the company decides to withdraw from a country that engages in "perva-
sive violations of basic human rights," it identifies concrete human rights reforms that must be made
before it will reverse its decision. Those criteria are based upon a detailed analysis by corporate staff
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lowing recommendations for companies that invest in China.
L Endorse and Adhere to China Code of Conduct
We believe that the human rights principles set forth in the code-of-
conduct legislation described in part I.B.5 represent minimum standards
for U.S. and other foreign companies operating in China. Accordingly,
we urge companies voluntarily to adhere to those principles, regardless of
whether the legislation is enacted into law. The effectiveness of corporate
adherence to these principles would be maximized if companies publicly
acknowledged their adherence.
We also believe that these principles would be most effective if they
were adopted by the American Chambers of Commerce in Hong Kong,
Beijing, and Shanghai and the Washington-based U.S.-China Business
Council to govern the activities of their member companies in China.
The endorsement of human rights principles by these organizations
would carry crucial significance both within the business community it-
self and with the Chinese government. Further, their adoption by the
above-named organizations would expand the impact of the principles,
since membership in these organizations is not entirely coextensive with
corporations covered by the code-of-conduct legislation (principally be-
cause of de minimis limitations on investments covered by the legislation
and similar jurisdictional provisions).
2 Assure Compliance with Code-of-Conduct Through Monitoring by
Professional Organizations
Each of the professional organizations noted under our first recom-
mendation should establish a human rights committee to oversee imple-
mentation by member companies of the code of conduct, as well as other
human rights activities by companies. In the latter regard, these commit-
tees should act in a ombudsman's role to provide advice and counsel to
companies that encounter human rights problems in their operations or
need help in reaching relevant Chinese officials to discuss human rights,
and generally should act as a clearing house for information and sharing
of relevant experiences among member companies.
Member companies should be required to file with the associations'
human rights committees annual reports describing their compliance
with the principles endorsed by each organization. These reports would
in many cases be the same as those to be submitted to the State Depart-
of the chief human rights concerns in the relevant country. Similarly, Levi Strauss & Co. identifies
concrete human rights goals that it will attempt to promote in countries where it maintains an
investment despite human rights problems.
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ment under the code-of-conduct bill described in part I.B.5. In addition,
member companies should be encouraged to submit, on an ongoing basis,
reports describing particular problems or successes encountered in the
course of their efforts to promote human rights, whether or not relevant
to specific principles set forth in a code of conduct. Such reports would
enable the human rights committees to consolidate experience and estab-
lish a data base of precedents that could be drawn upon in assisting mem-
ber companies to deal effectively with human rights issues in their China
business activities.
3. Work for Release of Political Prisoners
As indicated in part I.B.5.(8), we believe that companies could play
a particularly constructive role in securing the release of persons detained
solely because of peaceful political activities. We recommend that for-
eign companies operating in China "adopt" the cases of political prison-
ers held in the regions in which the companies' China operations are
most substantial. When, for example, senior executives of major U.S.
investors visit China, they should raise these cases in the course of their
meetings with high-level officials in Beijing.
A few examples of situations in which U.S. companies active in
China could exert their influence suggests both the magnitude of human
rights violations in the PRC and the considerable impact that the busi-
ness community could have in addressing them. The U.S. automobile
industry has been among the most active investors in the PRC, providing
China with badly needed capital, technology and management expertise
to upgrade the country's moribund vehicle production industry for both
commercial and industrial use. The Chrysler Corporation, for example,
has an important cooperative project in Changchun, Jilin Province, often
referred to as the "Detroit of China." In that city, Tang Yuanjuan, an
assistant engineer at an automobile plant, was sentenced to 20 years' im-
prisonment in November 1990 for "counterrevolution" as a result of his
activities in support of the 1989 democracy movement.1 63
General Motors has concluded a major investment project in Liao-
ning Province in northeast China, a province whose Lingyuan labor
camp has been particularly notorious for the number of political prison-
ers held there and for its abysmal living and working conditions. One
resident of the camp, Liu Gang, one of the 1989 student leaders, was
reported to have had his arm broken by jail warders and to have been
163 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: CONTINUED PATTERNS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CHINA, Al Index ASA 17/32/92, at 11 (1992).
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force-fed when he attempted to go on a hunger strike last November to
protest conditions in the camp.
The area comprising Shanghai and neighboring Jiangsu province, in
the heart of China's richest agricultural region, is home to numerous im-
portant U.S. investment ventures: Hoechst Celanese manufactures ingre-
dients for cigarette filters in Nantong; McDonnell-Douglas engages in
coproduction of aircraft in Shanghai; also in Shanghai, Squibb, S.C.
Johnson, and Johnson & Johnson have operations producing
pharmaceuticals, medical products and various other items, and Xerox
has a major joint venture project; Sheraton, Holiday Inn and other major
hotel companies play a key role as investors and/or managers of major
tourist hotels in this heart of China's tourist industry. This list could be
continued at length.
In this same area, prisoners are detained for the non-violent expres-
sion of political opinion and the exercise of other internationally-recog-
nized human rights. To cite just a few examples, Ma Zhiqiang, a worker
from Shanghai in his late 20s, was arrested in June 1989, reportedly for
attempting to form an independent trade union during the Spring 1989
democracy movement. Ma was apparently tried and sentenced to a five-
year term on charges of "counterrevolution."" 6  More recently, Fu
Shengi, who had previously served two terms in detention for political
dissidence, was sent to "reeducation through labor" for three years on
June 26, 1993, for his peaceful activities in support of other political dis-
sidents in Shanghai.165 One of the individuals Fu was accused of "agitat-
ing" is a worker currently being held in a police-run mental institution in
Shanghai, having attempted to form an independent trade union.
In Nanjing, Jiangsu province, Wu Jianmin, a 31-year-old worker in
the Nanjing Passenger Train Factory, was sentenced to 10 years' impris-
onment in April 1991 for starting a "counterrevolutionary organiza-
tion"-the Democratic United Front. Yang Tongyan, an employee of
the Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences, was sentenced to 10 years' im-
prisonment in 1991 for founding the China Democracy Party.
In fact, one need look no further than China's capital city to find
numerous examples of cases where U.S. companies with large-scale oper-
ations could play an effective role. As the nerve center of the 1989 de-
mocracy movement, Beijing has an especially large population of citizens
held in prisons or administrative detention centers on charges stemming
from their exercising the rights of free expression and freedom of associa-
164 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN CHINA, Al Index: ASA 17/5/92, at 32-33
(1992).
165 S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 12, 1993, at 1.
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tion. Many have been detained in the past year-long after the
Tiananmen incident-for ongoing attempts to promote human rights and
political change. In addition to names relatively well known abroad,
such as dissident leaders Wang Juntao, Chen Ziming and Ren Wanding,
Beijing's political prisoner population includes less known individuals
such as Zhang Yafei and Chen Yanbin, student organizers currently
serving 11- and 13-year sentences, respectively, for "counterrevolution."
More recent additions to Beijing's population of detained political activ-
ists include Chen Wei, a former student at the Beijing University of Sci-
ence and Engineering who was arrested (for the fourth time since June
1989) in May 1992 for his continuing involvement in underground pro-
democracy activities, and Liao Jia'an, a graduate student at People's Uni-
versity in Beijing, who was active in study groups and publications that
address democracy and political reform issues, and was recently tried for
"counterrevolution." 166
Examples of companies with major investment projects in Beijing
that could take up these and other cases in the course of their interac-
tions with Beijing and central authorities include Hewlett Packard, with
a large-scale cooperative computer operation in the capital, Babcock &
Wilcox, with a major joint venture producing boilers, and the PepsiCo
Corporation, whose participation in the several Kentucky Fried Chicken
and Pizza Hut outlets in Beijing (and numerous other projects in differ-
ent parts of China) give it a particularly high profile.
4. Include Human Rights Considerations in Feasibility Studies
We further recommend that U.S. and other foreign companies con-
templating activities in China include human rights considerations in the
feasibility studies generally required for investment projects. Just as
there is now generally included in such studies by U.S. corporations an
environmental impact report, so too there should be a human rights im-
pact report. Thus, for example, in considering an investment project in
the new special economic zone reportedly being created in Tibet to at-
tract foreign investment, 16 a potential investor should consider such
matters as the impact of the project on improving working conditions
and economic opportunities for ethnic Tibetans and the possibility of
prison labor being exploited for the venture. If a competing investment
opportunity is offered to the same company in, for example, the
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, the company should consider not only
166 See MAR. 1993 ASIA WATCH REPORT, supra note 5, at 13-15.
167 Tibetan Economic Zone Planned, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1992, at All.
Corporations and Human Rights
14:66 (1993)
the comparative economic advantages of each option, but also pertinent
human rights considerations.
In general, potential investors should favor investment opportunities
in regions that have a relatively positive human rights environment.
Competition among different locations in China for foreign investment
dollars is the order of the day, as reflected in a steady stream of local
regulations seeking to offer competitive deals on land fees, labor policies,
tax incentives, and the like. Foreign companies should advance this
competition by adding a new consideration to the list-human rights.
Decisions to invest in highly repressive regions should be made only
with a strong, and unambiguous, commitment to play a proactive role in
promoting human rights improvements, and a willingness to pull out if
such improvements do not materialize. For example, in an area like Ti-
bet, a U.S. company should undertake an investment venture only if it is
prepared to insist upon applying fair hiring practices that give an appro-
priate role to Tibetans in both management and skilled labor positions,
providing training to Tibetans that is equal to that afforded Han Chinese
staff, and making strong representations against any interference in
peaceful activities of Tibetan staff, such as participating in study groups
on Tibetan history and culture, and using the Tibetan language. Simi-
larly, current and future investors in Tibet should use appropriate oppor-
tunities to request information about and release of those imprisoned for
the peaceful advocacy of political views as well as for religious activities.
The point is that companies should consider, in advance of their
decision on an investment project, the human rights conditions in the
area where a project is contemplated and their potential ability to have a
positive influence on such problems as may exist or arise. A decision not
to make a particular investment would be appropriate if local human
rights conditions were poor and the company's position in the contem-
plated venture or the economic importance of the project would not en-
able it to have a significant impact on human rights conditions.
Similarly, a company should not undertake an investment in a highly
repressive area if the benefit of the investment to the regime would likely
outweigh any positive impact the project could have.
5. Assemble Data on Human Rights Conditions by Region
To facilitate investors' consideration of human rights factors, profes-
sional organizations, such as the American Chamber of Commerce in
Hong Kong and the U.S.-China Business Council, that publish for their
members periodic assessments of investment conditions in various parts
of China should add human rights conditions to the factors they cur-
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rently address-regulatory incentives, fiscal conditions, environmental is-
sues, and the like. These human rights data should include such
information as the nature of working conditions, discrimination against
minority groups, and numbers of political prisoners in regions covered.
Such reporting could draw on the extensive reporting of non-governmen-
tal human rights organizations and the State Department's annual
human rights reports.
In addition, member companies should be asked to submit informa-
tion concerning their observations about human rights conditions in ar-
eas where they operate. This information could significantly enhance the
base of currently available information, as businesspersons employed
full-time in China are in a position to develop greater familiarity with
certain practices than representatives of organizations based outside
China and of the U.S. government.
None of the proposals advanced in this section would require U.S.
businesses or business associations to engage in activity that would vio-
late Chinese law or policy. They would, however, go a long way toward
assuring that U.S. business activities in China promote basic human
rights values and do not in any way condone or participate in their
violation.
CONCLUSION
A nascent corps of transnational businesses are establishing new
mileposts for corporate responsibility in respect of human rights. Their
initiatives have been shaped, above all, by the daunting challenges
presented to foreign investors in China in the wake of the June 1989
clampdown by the PRC. But if their efforts have been largely propelled
by Tiananmen, their impact will reach far beyond China. Indeed, the
human rights policies adopted by these companies have already been ex-
tended beyond the PRC to the global market. And while only a small
number of businesses have adopted comprehensive human rights policies,
they already have succeeded in refraining the terms of debate within cor-
porate boardrooms about the appropriate role of businesses in addressing
human rights abroad. It is no small measure of their impact that the
center of public debate has now shifted from the issue whether businesses
should be expected to address human rights conditions in their overseas
operations, to the question of what, precisely, their responsibilities are.
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APPENDIX A
Human Rights Provisions of Levi Strauss & Co.'s "Business Partner
Terms of Engagement"
Our concerns include the practices of individual business partners as well
as the political and social issues in those countries where we might con-
sider sourcing.
This defines Terms of Engagement which addresses issues that are sub-
stantially controllable by our individual business partners. We have de-
fined business partners as contractors and suppliers who provide labor
and/or material (including fabric, sundries, chemicals and/or stones) uti-
lized in the manufacture and finishing of our products.
3. HEALTH & SAFETY
We will only utilize business partners who provide workers with a safe
and healthy work environment. Business partners who provide residen-
tial facilities for their workers must provide safe and healthy facilities.
5. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
We will only do business with partners whose workers are in all cases
present voluntarily, not put at risk of physical harm, fairly compensated,
allowed the right of free association and not exploited in any way. In
addition, the following specific guidelines will be followed.
* WAGES AND BENEFITS
We will only do business with partners who provide wages and benefits
that comply with any applicable law or match the prevailing local manu-
facturing or finishing industry practices. We will also favor business
partners who share our commitment to contribute to the betterment of
community conditions.
* WORKING HouRs
While permitting flexibility in scheduling, we will identify prevailing lo-
cal work hours and seek business partners who do not exceed them ex-
cept for appropriately compensated overtime. While we favor partners
who utilize less than sixty-hour work weeks, we will not use contractors
who, on a regularly scheduled basis, require in excess of a sixty-hour
week. Employees should be allowed one day off in seven days.
* CHILD LABOR
Use of child labor is not permissible. "Child" is defined as less than 14
years of age or younger than the compulsory age to be in school. We will
not utilize partners who use child labor in any of their facilities. We
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support the development of legitimate workplace apprenticeship pro-
grams for the educational benefit of younger people.
* PRISON LABOR/FORCED LABOR
We will not knowingly utilize prison or forced labor in contracting or
subcontracting relationships in the manufacture of our products. We
will not knowingly utilize or purchase materials from a business partner
utilizing prison or forced labor.
* DISCRIMINATION
While we recognize and respect cultural differences, we believe that
workers should be employed on the basis of their ability to do the job,
rather than on the basis of personal characteristics or beliefs. We will
favor business partners who share this value.
* DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES
We will not utilize business partners who use corporal punishment or
other forms of mental or physical coercion.
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APPENDIX B
Reebok International Ltd.'s "Human Rights Production Standards"
Reebok's devotion to human rights worldwide is a hallmark of our cor-
porate culture. As a corporation in an ever-more global economy we will
not be indifferent to the standards of our business partners around the
world.
We believe that the incorporation of internationally recognized human
rights standards into our business practice improves worker morale and
results in a higher quality working environment and higher quality
products.
In developing this policy, we have sought to use standards that are fair,
that are appropriate to diverse cultures and that encourage workers to
take pride in their work.
Non-Discrimination
Reebok will seek business partners that do not discriminate in hiring and
employment practices on grounds of race, color, national origin, gender,
religion, or political or other opinion.
Working hours/overtime
Reebok will seek business partners who do not require more than 60-
hour work weeks on a regularly scheduled basis, except for appropriately
compensated overtime in compliance with local laws, and we will favor
business partners who use 48-hour work weeks as their maximum normal
requirement.
Forced or Compulsory Labor
Reebok will not work with business partners that use forced or other
compulsory labor, including labor that is required as a means of political
coercion or as punishment for holding or for peacefully expressing polit-
ical views. In the manufacture of its products, Reebok will not purchase
materials that were produced by forced prison or other compulsory labor
and will terminate business relationships with any sources found to util-
ize such labor.
Fair Wages
Reebok will seek business partners who share our commitment to the
betterment of wage and benefits levels that address the basic needs of
workers and their families so far as possible and appropriate in light of
national practices and conditions. Reebok will not select business part-
ners that pay less than the minimum wage required by local law or that
pay less than prevailing local industry practices (whichever is higher).
Northwestern Journal of
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Child Labor
Reebok will not work with business partners that use child labor. The
term "child" generally refers to a person who is less than 14 years of age,
or younger than the age of completing compulsory education if that age
is higher than 14. In countries where the law defines "child" to include
individuals who are older than 14, Reebok will apply that definition.
Freedom of Association
Reebok will seek business partners that share its commitment to the
rights of employees to establish and join organizations of their own
choosing. Reebok will seek to assure that no employee is penalized be-
cause of his or her non-violent exercise of this right. Reebok recognizes
and respects the right of all employees to organize and bargain
collectively.
Safe and Healthy Work Environment
Reebok will seek business partners that strive to assure employees a safe
and healthy workplace and that do not expose workers to hazardous
conditions.
Corporations and Human Rights
14:66 (1993)
APPENDIX C
Human Rights Provisions of Phillips-Van Heusen Policy "A Shared
Commitment: Requirements for Suppliers, Contractors,
Business Partners"
"Guidelines for Vendors"
... The following guidelines address issues which are substantially con-
trollable by our vendors:
ETHICAL STANDARDS.
We will not do business with any vendor who discriminates based on
race, gender or religion. We will not do business with any vendor who
violates the legal and moral rights of employees in any way.
HEALTH AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
We will only do business with vendors who provide employees with a
safe and healthy work environment. Vendors should make a responsible
contribution to the health care needs of their employees.
"Employment Practices"
We will not do business with any vendor who fails to consistently treat
employees fairly with regard to wages, benefits and working conditions.
Specifically, the following guidelines apply: We will only do business
with vendors who provide reasonable wages and benefits that match or
exceed the prevailing local industry standard.
While permitting flexibility in scheduling, we will only do business with
vendors who do not exceed prevailing local work hours and who appro-
priately compensate overtime. No employee should be scheduled for
more than sixty hours of work per week, and we will favor vendors who
utilize work weeks of less than sixty hours. Employees should be allowed
at least one day off per seven day week.
We will not be associated with any vendor who uses any form of mental
or physical coercion. We will not do business with any vendor who
utilizes prison or forced labor.
We will not do business with any vendor who denies their employees
appropriate access to education, health care, religious observance or fam-
ily obligations.
We will favor vendors who share our commitment to contribute to the
betterment of the communities in which they operate.
